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Symposium on Administrative Law
TO WHAT EXTENT CAN THERE BE FORMULATED RULES WITH RESPECT TO
WHAT CONSTITUTES A FAIR ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING, WHICH ARE GEN-
ERALLY APPLICABLE TO DIFFERENT ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS AND TO
DIFFERENT KINDS OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION?
RALPH F. FUCHS
Professor of Lawv, Washington University
M R. President, Members and Guestsof the Association: I suspect that
the selection by the Executive Committee
of this topic 'for discussion this after-
noon is indicative of a change in empha-
sis in the field of public law which it
seems to me has occurred during the past
few years. The great questions of pub-
lic law-only three or four short years ago
had to do with the scope of legislative
power, with the scope of the power of
state legislatures and of Congress to
regulate industry in such matters as price
fixing, with the scope of the commerce
power and of the taxing power wielded
by Congress. But those questions, for
the time being at least, seem largely to
have been settled.
With Nebbia v. New York, 54 S.Ct.
505, 78 L.Ed. 940, 89 A.L.R. 1469, the
power of legislatures to engage in price
fixing in fields where theretofore it had
been thought impossible was established
with reasonable firmness. With West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379,
57 S.Ct. 578, 81 L.Ed. 703, 108 A.L.R.
1330, the power of legislatures to es-
tablish minimum wages for women seems
to have been conceded with rather defi-
nite effect. The National Labor Rela-
tions cases have so materially broadened
the scope of the commerce power as to
open up to Congress areas of regulation
which seem reasonably adequate to the
needs of the present situation. Similar-
ly, the Social Security Act cases and
others have removed from the field of
immediate difficulty the outstanding con-
stitutional obstacles to legislative regula-
tion which existed until a short time
ago.
There are, of course, plenty of ques-
tions remaining. There still exist on
each important constitutional issue two
lines of cases, the liberal and the strict.
They are there to be invoked, either for
the enlargement or for the restriction of
legislative power in the future. Fed-
eral incorporation of corporations en-
gaged in business will give rise to con-
stitutional litigation. The Fair Labor
Standards Act will have to be passed
upon before we can be sure that it is
within the power of Congress. But, by
and large, we can now look at public
law with some assurance that the Con-
stitution has been made flexible enough
and broad enough to permit of the nec-
essary legislative efforts.
The emphasis, therefore, in public law
has shifted in recent months to ques-
tions of administrative procedure. The
landmark cases that make the front pages
as the Supreme Court decides them these
days have to do with notice and hearing
and the right to be confronted with the
evidence against one in an administra-
tive proceeding. The case which has
most recently brought to the fore pub-
lic interest in administrative procedure
is the famous Morgan case [Morgan v.
U. S.], 304 U.S. 1, 58 S.Ct. 773, 999,
82 L.Ed. 1129, decided just last year
by the Supreme Court. Before that, the
Panama Refining case [Panama Refin-
ing Co. v. Ryan], 293 U.S. 388, 55 S.Ct.
241, 79 L.Ed. 446, for the first time
brought to the attention of the public
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and of administrators the doctrine that
findings of fact must accompany execu-
tive regulations which operate with penal
effect, if those regulations are to be held
constitutional under the due process
clause. With these procedural ques-
tions, going to the very root of admin-
istrative effectiveness, being dealt with
by the Supreme Court in landmark cases,
we have had general public interest, al-
most an unbelievable public interest, in
fairly technical questions of administra-
tive procedure; and it is those questions
which we are confronted with here this
afternoon.
It is perhaps worthy of note, also, that
within the field of administrative law
itself there has been a shift of emphasis
during the past two or three years. The
cases I have just mentioned deal with
administrative procedure. Before that,
the most prominent administrative law
decisions were those that dealt with the
scope of judicial review. The great
question was how far the courts should
control administrative agencies in the
exercise of their regulatory powers.
Back in 1920, we had the case of Ohio
Valley Water Company v. Ben Avon
Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 40 S.Ct. 527,
64 L.Ed. 908. In 1932, we had the case
of Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 52
S.Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 598, and in 1937,
the St. Joseph Stockyards case [St. Jo-
seph Stock Yards Co. v. U. S.], 298 U.
S. 38, 56 S.Ct. 720, 80 L.Ed. 1033, all
of which enlarged the previously pre-
vailing conceptions of the length to which
the courts might go in reviewing admin-
istrative orders, particularly in the field
of public utility rate fixing.
The issues which those cases raise, and
which have been dealt with in numerous
other cases as well, still remain unsettled.
We don't know, with finality or certain-
ty, what the scope of judicial review
should be and will be in public utility
rate fixing or in other fields of admin-
istration, but the questions which con-
cern us now and which are before us
this afternoon are the cases dealing not
with judicial review but with the pro-
cedure in the first instance of admin-
istrative agencies themselves.
Each of the recent cases dealing with
administrative procedure, I mean the
landmark cases which .1 mentioned, laid
down broad propositions whose applica-
tion to administrative procedure was
very difficult to determine. In the Pana-
ma Refining case, the opinion gave little
guidance as to just how wide an area
of executive regulation was subject to
the requirement that regulations be ac-
companied by findings as a condition of
their validity. In the Morgan case the
Supreme Court again left very much
in doubt the question of how far the re-
quirement of the case, which purported
to be merely the interpretation of a stat-
ute but which had distinct constitutional
implications, extended over other fields
of administration. The case itself, of
course, involved the Packers and Stock-
yards Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 181 et seq.; but
the court, as the newspapers quickly
brought out, spoke of the basic require-
ments of fair play in administrative pro-
cedure generally and asserted that the
decision in an administrative proceeding
must be by the official who heard the
parties, or else that the official who con-
ducted the hearing must make an interim
report to" the deciding official, with op-
portunity for argument by those affect-
ed by the proceedings. That require-
ment was put forth by the court in such
a way as to make it seem that it had
much wider application than merely in
the administration of the Packers and
Stockyards Act.
Those decisions, with their extremely
broad implications and their evident re-
liance upon constitutional doctrine, even
though in the Morgan case there hap-
pened to be simply the interpretation of
a statute involved, threw the administra-
tive world in Washington into a great
deal of uncertainty and confusion. Each
of these cases was followed by an offset-
ting one. The Panama Refining case
was followed by Pacific States Box and
Basket Company v. White, 296 U.S. 176,
56 S.Ct. 159, 80 L.Ed. 138, 101 A.L.R.
853, in which the court did not apply
the proposition that there must be find-
ings accompanying an executive regula-
tion to the regulations of a state de-
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partment of agriculture governing the
sizes and shapes of containers for straw-
berries and raspberries, saying they were
not the same type of regulations which
the Panama case involved. The differ-
ences, however, are a bit difficult to dis-
cern, since both regulations affected
numerous business enterprises and both
of them operated with penal effect. Thus
the offsetting case, while it lent assurance
that strict procedural requirements would
not necessarily be applied over the en-
tire field of administration, still left wide-
spread the doubt into which the original
decision had thrown the administrative
world.
The Morgan case has been followed
by the Mackay Radio and Telegraph
case [National Labor Relations Board v.
Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.], 304
U.S. 333, 58 S.Ct. 904, 82 L.Ed. 1381,
at the last term of court, in which the
court did not apply the propositions of
the Morgan case to a proceeding before
the National Labor Relations Board,
upon the ground that, in that case, the
issues the respondent was having to meet
had been sufficiently defined by the
Board and that, therefore, some of the
procedural safeguards insisted upon in
the Morgan case need not be applied.
But again, the precise extent of the ap-
plication of the doctrine of the Morgan
,case remains in doubt; and administra-
tors are searching, apparently, for cri-
teria whereby they can determine what
procedures are constitutionally necessary
in the first place, and what procedures
are desirable and effective in the second
place, in the administration of the acts
which are entrusted to them to carry out.
Practicing lawyers who must appear
before administrative commissions like-
wise seem to be searching for, criteria of
what constitutional issues they can prop-
erly raise in cases which they present in
behalf of their clients. Law teachers,
scholars in the field of law, presumably
are searching also for criteria which
will aid them both in teaching and in
public discussion of the problems of ad-
ministrative law-criteria which will as-
sist them to lay out the field in an under-
standable manner.
The actual determination of adminis-
trative procedure takes place, of course,
in three stages, the stage of statutory
drafting, the stage in which the admin-
istrative agency within statutory limits
determines its own procedure, and the
stage in which a court, upon judicial re-
view, has an opportunity to pass upon
procedure that has been adopted and,
expressly or by inference, to lay down
requirements for future administrative
procedure.
At all these stages in the determination
of administrative procedure the central
question is, or ought to be, what pro-
cedure will be most conducive to the suc-
cessful performance of the particular ad-
ministrative function for which the pro-
cedure is being devised, having in mind,
also, due protection to affected private
interests. That question must remain a
specific one. It is a question which in
each instance bears directly upon the
procedure of a particular administrative
agency. The approach of the legislator,
of the administrator and of the judge,
must be an approach which is specific,
which centers upon the problem immedi-
ately confronting the official, in what-
ever branch of the government he may
happen' to be. But in searching for
guidance as to what to do, it is not only
the prattical considerations arising in the
particular field but possibly also cate-
gories and analogies that may be estab-
lished by study of the problems of pro-
cedure that can be made a reliance in
the framing of new administrative pro-
cedures.
That is where the group of law teach-
ers enters the picture. If we have a
function in connection with the devising..
of administrative procedures, it is the
function of investigation followed by the
establishment of categories which will be
of assistance to officials in the devising
of new procedures. Neither legislators
nor judges nor administrators have the
time or the facilities to engage in the
research and in the thought which might
lead to the establishment of the cate-
gories that would be useful to them.
So I suggest that, in the course of this
discussion this afternoon, we remain
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conscious of the approach which the
particular speaker is making. He may
be making the approach of the official
who is concerned with the problems of
the particular agency with which he is
dealing and who does not purport to
draw generalizations in regard to ad-
ministrative procedure as a whole. The
value of his material for law teachers,
as such, lies largely in the contribution
which the data make to the consideration
of the general problem. If the speaker,
on the other hand, is endeavoring to
draw generalizations from data, then he
speaks in the capacity which most of us
occupy.
It is a question, of course, whether ad-
ministrative procedure can be treated in
a generalized manner. It is possible that
generalizations may simply obscure the
difficulty rather than help in the solution
of problems. If each administrative
agency is so unique that its problems can-
not fruitfully be considered in connection
with the problems of other agencies and
in connection with categories of proce-
dure that may be established, then the
effort of scholars to establish categories
must necessarily fail. But I believe that
that is not the situation. It seems to
me that adequate analysis necessarily re-
veals that it is possible to examine ad-
ministration, to consider the problems of
procedure, and to establish categories
and suggestions which are realistic and
fruitful in the solution of particular
problems as they arise.
I should like, before closing, to sug-
gest a few considerations that seem to
me to bear upon the problem of estab-
lishing categories for administrative pro-
cedure with which we are confronted at
the present time.
In the first place, I think it is clear
that the attempt to establish a significant
classification of administrative functions
on the basis of the theory of the separa-
tion of powers has definitely failed. It
is impossible to define three functions of
government which correspond to the
three aggregates of powers that have
been conferred upon the three depart-
ments of government. The attempt to.
say that administrative functions are
quasi-legislative on the one hand, quasi-
judicial on the other, and that procedure
can be framed which is suitable for those
two categories, considered more or less
distinct from each other, is leading to
increased confusion rather than to the
solution of our problems. We meet, for
example, with the oft-repeated proposi-
tion that rate fixing is a quasi-legislative
proceeding in which quasi-judicial meth-
ods are employed. Such a proposition is
not helpful in the solution of practical
problems. It has led recently to a de-
cision in a United States District Court,
although only a tentative one in the
course of the granting of a temporary in-
junction, that a minimum wage order ap-
plicable over an entire state and to,
numerous occupations within the state
is an order which must be formulated by
means of the strict procedure contem-
plated in the Morgan case. Now, when
you consider the nature of the problem
confronting a state board in laying down
a minimum wage of such extensive ap-
plication, it seems to me that you must
concede that the very careful quasi-ju-
dicial type of procedure which the Mor-
gan case contemplates is necessarily in-
applicable. You cannot grant to every
party affected by such an order the type
of hearing which the court, in the Mor-
gan case, had in mind. You cannot
frame the issues with sufficient definite-
ness. Certainly you cannot isolate a suf-
ficiently small number of issues so that
the evidence may bear directly upon each
of them and be subject to successful
handling in this quasi-judicial manner.
In the second place, I think we will
have to consider it as established that
the gathering of data through intensive
study of particular administrative agen-
cies is going to continue to be the most
definite and fruitful method of enrich-
ing the study of administrative law. Inx
the work that has been done along these
lines we have our principal body of in-
formation for devising more realistic
administration procedures. The studies
of Henderson and Sharfman and Patter-
son and Dodd in different fields of ad-
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ministration give us what we have in the
way of information upon which to go.
We need more of that kind of work, and
we are not going to progress far in solv-
ing the problems of administrative pro-
cedure unless we do get more.
But, after the data have been gathered,
it is still necessary to discern common
elements in the functioning of different
administrative agencies and to lay down
criteria which are useful for procedural
purposes on the basis of those common
elements. And I believe it is possible
to analyze administrative processes in
such a way as to make generalizations
possible which incorporate the results
of the study of particular administrative
agencies.
An administrative investigation which
must precede the issuance of an admin-
istrative order of some kind is certain to
have the elements which any investiga-
tion must have, namely, in the first place,
the formulation of questions involved in
the problem that is to be taken up; sec-
ond, the receiving and considering of evi-
dence bearing upon those questions;
thirdly, arriving at conclusions, or find-
ings if you will, in regard to those ques-
tions involved in the problem; and, last-
ly, the reaching of the answer to the
problem in terms of the findings that
have been made and in the light either of
the provisions of a statute or of admin-
istrative discretion exercised within the
limits fixed by statute. That is to say,
we can assert that in administrative in-
vestigations there must be the definition
of the issues; there must be the recep-
tion of evidence.; there must be the
formulation, if not explicitly then by
implication, of conclusions in regard to
those issues; there must be a decision;
and that decision may be either a deci-
sion of law or a decision which is dis-
cretionary, within limits defined by law.
If that is true of administrative inves-
tigations generally, then we are some dis-
tance along the road to fruitful gen-
eralization.
In considering what procedures are
most useful and best adapted to carry-
ing fdrward these several steps in any
particular administrative proceeding, I
believe there are certain other factors
that we can well keep in mind and which
may be the basis of more particular rules
that still have a wider application than a
single administrative agency.
In the first place, we do distinguish
and need to distinguish between regu-
latory administrative functions and the
non-regulatory; the regulatory which
bear directly on some particular interest,
usually of a private nature, and the non-
regulatory which have to do largely with
the administration of the government,
the Army regulations, for example.
In the second place, if you have a
regulatory function, sometimes the pro-
ceeding will affect many parties, some-
times only a few. The procedure which
is adapted to the investigation is neces-
sarily going to vary with the number of
parties affected. You can't grant as
careful a hearing when there are many
as when there are only a few. Further-
more, you often cannot get many par-
ties represented before an administra-
tive agency which is passing upon a gen-
eral problem. Representation of the af-
fected parties has got to be taken care
of by other means than their own ap-
pearance or the appearance of counsel in
their behalf.
In the third place, I think that we
must give attention to the nature of the
problems which are involved in differ-
ent types of administrative proceedings.
You have problems which involve pub-
lic health and safety, for example, which
are quite different in the procedures
they call for, from problems of economic
control.
Within any particular field of admin-
istration there are different types of de-
terminations to be made. If you take the
recent Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,
21 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq., for example,
you can see in the rule-making power of
the Secretary of Agriculture, conferred
by that Act, at least three classes of ques-
tions with which the administration has
to deal. There are questions of scientific
determination such as the amount of
spray residue, poisonous spray residue,
which can be permitted on fresh fruit
without harm to consumers-a strictly
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scientific problem, which calls for a dif-
ferent procedure of investigation from
the problem, for example, of determin-
ing what is the minimum acceptable
standard for canned peaches, because
there the standard is not a standard af-
fecting health and safety but a standard
of quality involving the judgment of con-
sumers and the custom of the trade with
regard to the matter in hand. The type
of investigation needed in that kind of
administrative rule-making is quite dif-
ferent from that which is adapted to de-
termining a scientific question. The
third kind of question which the Secre-
tary has to determine under the Act is
the psychological effect, for example, of
labels on food and drug products-
whether certain sizes of type, whether
certain wordings, will effectively pro-
duce the desired impression upon the
mind of consumers, or not.
We have also to consider, in arriving
at generalizations in regard to adminis-
trative procedure, such questions as the
nature of the sanctions which are going
to be applied in order to enforce an ad-
ministrative order. If the sanctions are
penal, as the Supreme Court recognized
in the Panama Refining case, then in all
probability greater care in procedure is
called for than if the sanctions are other
than penal. But, of course, the depriva-
tion of a license upon which the liveli-
hood of an individual or the financial
solvency of a corporation depends is an
equally drastic sanction.
If we take these several elements
which bear upon suitable procedure, and
if we have them in mind as we examine
the data growing out of study of par-
ticular administrative agencies, then I
think it is possible that, as scholars, we
can contribute to the solution of our
administrative problems generalizations
which will be at once realistic and yet
broad enough to furnish effective guid-
ance. I believe also that we should be
acutely conscious as we consider the task
confronting us, that upon its successful
performance there may turn the contin-
ued existence of our capitalist democra-.
cy, if one may call it that. It is through
administrative control that this country
today is seeking to preserve the system
that it has. If that control works effi-
ciently, if it results in the satisfaction of
those human demands which are made
upon our economic and political sys-
tem, then our capitalist democracy may
endure. But if the administrative sys-
tem is tied up with procedural handicaps,
if it is prevented from functioning ef-
ficiently by the poor performance of the
procedural tasks, then the system may
break down. It is the legal profession,
it is the law teachers, to whom falls the
task of devising suitable procedures; for
lawyers have been, from the beginning,
the experts whom society has provided,
whose services it has employed, in solv-
ing the problems of procedure where
government bears upon group and pri-
vate interests.
J. WARREN MADDEN
Chairman, National Labor Relations Board
I President Arant, Ladies and Gentle-
men of the Association, and your Guests:
Coming as I do, from an atmosphere
which, upon occasions, is something less
than calm and philosophical and contem-
plative, I think I can appreciate more
than I ever did before the mastery which
teachers have an opportunity to acquire
and do acquire over subjects, by their
academic study and observation of them,
which is quite impossible to the people.
who are in the midst of them.
So, this fine introduction, showing as
it does the understanding of the general-
izations which do or may run through
administrative process, has struck in me,
particularly, admiration.
The enforcement of legislation through
administrative procedures has two pri-
mary aims. One is to place the initial
enforcement proceedings in the hands of
a body of experts sympathetic with the
purposes of the statute and possessing
the specialized knowledge essential to an
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adequate handling of the complex prob-
lems with which much of our present
day legislation deals. The other is to
achieve a more rapid and more efficient
disposition of the numerous controver-
sies bound to arise out of almost any
piece of legislation dealing with our more
serious problems. The administrative
process has developed in response to the
inevitable extension of government regu-
lation designed to bring some order into
the increasing complexities of modern
economic society. I think it cannot be
doubted that some such procedure is vi-
tal if the techniques of government are
to keep pace with the development of our
economic, social and political life.
The National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., well illustrates
the field in which administrative proce-
dures are essential to the successful op-
eration of legislation. The problems of
labor relations are delicate and complex.
Prosecuting and judicial agencies in ex-
istence at the passage of the Act were in
general ill equipped by training or expe-
rience to deal with problems arising in
this field. At the same time the need for
speed and dispatch is urgent. A labor
situation does not remain in statu quo
for long. It is likely either to develop
rapidly into an explosion or to subside
quickly into nothing. In short if the
rights of workers to self-organization
and collective bargaining are to be pre-
served, it must be done through machin-
ery that is directed by experts and de-
signed for swift and efficient disposition
of controversies. The fate of Section 7
(a) of the National Industrial Recovery
Act-the enforcement of which was at-
tempted through non-administrative pro-
cedure-adequately points the lesson in
this respect.
At the same time there is much con-
cern expressed today over the expansion
of the administrative process in the field
of governmental regulation. Without
doubt a good deal of this concern is based
upon opposition to the regulation itself
rather than the method of its enforce-
ment; and the propaganda of those with
this point of view is unquestionably re-
sponsible for even more of the fears that
10
have been expressed over the rapid de-
velopment of the administrative process.
Nevertheless it must be admitted that the
establishment of general safeguards, to
be administered by the judiciary where
necessary, is vital to the preservation of
the democratic process. These safe-
guards must not be so restrictive, or ap-
plied with such disregard for the prob-
lems to be solved, that they jeopardize
legitimate methods or objectives of the
administrative process. The unintelli-
gent, or unsympathetic, application of
general procedural restrictions could
readily cripple and destroy the function-
ing of almost any administrative agency.
On the other hand the safeguards should
be sufficient to guarantee against abuse
of the administrative process.
Fundamental to any such check upon
the administrative process is the require-
ment of a "fair hearing." I agree with
Professor Fuchs that the question wheth-
er general rules can be laid down to
guarantee a fair hearing must be ap-
proached first through a consideration of
the specific procedures of specific admin-
istrative agencies. I will endeavor, there-
fore, to outline briefly the procedure of
the National Labor Relations Board and
then to consider certain problems of fair
hearing which have been raised by our
experience in administration thus far.
Under the National Labor Relations
Act, the National Labor Relations Board
has two general functions, the adminis-
tration of each of which has a procedure
somewhat different from the other.
First the Act guarantees to employees
the right of freedom in self-organization
and the right of collective bargaining
with their employer. Interference with
the right of self-organization by employ-
ers, and the refusal by an employer to
bargain collectively with the representa-
tives of his employees, are unfair labor
practices. Where an employer has en-
gaged or is engaging in unfair labor
practices the Board is empowered to pre-
vent their recurrence and to require af-
firmative action necessary to restore the
status quo. Secondly, the Act sets up
machinery by which the Board may de-
termine who has been selected as the rep-
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resentative of the employees in an appro-
priate bargaining unit and who, there-
fore, has exclusive rights of collective
bargaining with the employer.
The Board administers the Act through
a staff at Washington and through twen-
ty-two regional offices throughout the
country. Each regional office consists of
a Regional Director, with his assistants,
and a Regional Attorney, with subordi-
nate attorneys. I will consider first the
Board's procedure with respect to its
functions of preventing and remedying
unfair labor practices.
Upon the filing of a charge that a vio-
lation of the Act has occurred, the re-
gional office sends an agent to investi-
gate. If the charge seems justified, the
Regional Director or his agent attempts
to obtain an adjustment through volun-
tary compliance with the Act. As in the
case of most other statutes, the great ma-
jority of the cases are adjusted in this
manner without resort to formal legal
proceedings. Throughout the period of
its existence thus far, a little over three
years, the Board had handled a total of
more than 18,000 cases. Of these, 14,-
000 cases, or over three quarters, have
been closed, and of the cases closed more
than 95 per cent were closed by volunta-
ry adjustment. Thus only 5 per cent in-
volved the necessity of a hearing or oth-
er formal action under the Act.
Where it is impossible to secure an ad-
justment and the facts seem to point to
a violation of the Act the Regional Di-
rector issues and serves upon the em-
ployer a complaint setting forth the facts
upon which the Board bases its jurisdic-
tion and the alleged facts relating to the
unfair labor practices. Accompanying
the complaint is a notice of a hearing be-
fore a trial examiner designated by the
Board. The trial examiner, it should be
noted, is appointed by the Chief Trial
Examiner who is responsible to the Sec-
retary of the Board and who is not a
part of the Legal Division.
At the hearing the Board's attorney
presents the evidence in support of the
complaint. An attorney for the labor
organization involved is often present
and may likewise participate. The re-
spondent may of course appear through
its attorney and offer evidence in its de-
fence. Under the Act the rules of evi-
dence prevailing in courts of law or eq-
uity are not controlling. Nevertheless
the hearing in general is conducted in ac-
cordance with the usual rules of evidence
and departures therefrom are permitted
by the trial examiner only where ade-
quate reason is shown.
At the conclusion of the hearing the
trial examiner normally issues a so-called
Intermediate Report containing his find-
ings as to the facts and his recommenda-
tions as to relief. The Intermediate Re-
port is served on the parties to the pro-
ceeding, who are notified that exceptions
and requests for oral argument or briefs
should be filed with the Board within a
stated period. If exceptions to the In-
termediate Report are filed or if the rec-
ommendations of the trial examiner are
not complied with, the case comes before
the Board for decision. In a few cases
the Board transfers the case to itself im-
mediately after hearing without an In-
termediate Report from the trial examin-
er. In such instances the Board, prior to
issuing a final decision, issues proposed
findings of fact, proposed conclusions of
law and a proposed order, to which the
parties may file exceptions and request
oral argument or briefs in the same man-
ner as in the case of an Intermediate Re-
port.
Oral argument is heard before the
Board itself in Washington whenever re-
quested by any of the parties or, occa-
sionally, upon request of the Board it-
self. Briefs are always accepted and
considered upon the request of any of
the parties or likewise occasidnally upon
request of the Board.
The case is now ready for decision by
the Board. Despite the relatively small
number of cases which go to hearing, the
absolute number of cases which come
before the Board for decision is large.
During the past three years the Board
has issued some 1,200 decisions. At the
present time there are several hundred
cases pending before the Board for deci-
sion. The average record in each case is
well over 1,000 pages. It can readily be
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seen from these figures that the Board
members themselves cannot expect to
read the records. In making its deci-
sions the Board therefore avails itself of
assistants known as review attorneys who
are under the direction of an Assistant
General Counsel and a group of super-
visors. The review attorneys analyze
the evidence, inform the Board of the
contentions of all parties and the testi-
mony relating thereto, and make initial
drafts of the Board's findings and order.
In every case the Board's decision con-
tains findings of fact and an order either
dismissing the complaint or requiring the
respondent to cease and desist from its
unfair labor practices and to take certain
affirmative action to restore the status
quo and effectuate the purposes of the
Act. The order of the Board is not self-
enforceable. If the respondent does not
comply with the Board's order it is nec-
essary for the Board to petition the ap-
propriate Circuit Court of Appeals for
enforcement. The respondent may like-
wise petition a Circuit Court for review
of the Board's order. On any review in
the circuit court the Board's findings of
fact, if supported by evidence, are con-
clusive. The Court has of course full
leeway to consider and decide questions
of law. Among the questions of law
properly before the Court is the question
whether the Board's procedure has been
proper and whether a fair hearing has
been accorded the respondent under the
Act and under the due process clause of
the Constitution.
The procedure for the certification of
representatives follows a somewhat simi-
lar pattern. Upon the filing of a petition
for certification, the Board's agent inves-
tigates and, if it appears that a question
concerning representation has arisen, at-
tempts to secure adjustment through an
informal check of union membership,
through a consent election, or through
other similar informal proceedings.
Where such adjustment is impossible the
Board, upon recommendation of its Re-
gional Director, authorizes an investiga-
tion. The Regional Director issues a no-
tice of hearing which is served upon the
employer involved, upon the labor or-
ganization filing the petition and upon
any other labor organizations known to
the Regional Director to be claiming
members among the employees involved.
A hearing is held before a trial examin-
er. In these cases no complaint is issued
and the role of the Board's attorney is
one of an investigator rather than prose-
cutor. In general if the labor organiza-
tions involved are represented by coun-
sel, the primary burden of establishing
the case is left to such counsel.
Upon the conclusion of the hearing
the trial examiner does not submit an In-
termediate Report. He issues an infor-
mal report for the guidance of the Board
alone. The Board then, with the assist-
ance of a review attorney, makes its de-
cision. It may either dismiss the peti-
tion, may certify representatives upon
the basis of the record, or may direct an
election. In the latter event the election
is held tinder the supervision of the Re-
gional Director.
The method of conducting eleGtions
cannot be considered in detail at this
time. In general it may be said that the
election is supervised directly by an agent
of the Board but that representatives of
interested labor organizations are enti-
tled to participate as observers and un-
der normal circumstances an agent of the
employer is likewise permitted to partic-
ipate.
Following the ballot the Regional Di-
rector issues his Intermediate Report
containing his conclusions as to the re-
sults of the election. Any of the par-
ties, including the employer, has the op-
portunity to file objections to this Inter-
mediate Report. If no objections are
filed, the Regional Director submits the
report to the Board and the Board there-
upon certifies representatives, or if no
representative has been chosen, dismisses
the proceeding. If objections are filed to
the report of the Regional Director but
the objections do not raise any substan-
tial or material issue the Board proceeds
in the same manner as if no objections
were filed. If the Regional Director con-
siders that the objections do raise a sub-
stantial or material issue, he serves fur-
ther notice on the parties to appear be-
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fore a trial examiner in support of their
objections. In such cases the trial exam-
iner takes testimony but again does not
render any Intermediate Report. The
record of the testimony is transferred to
the Board for decision and the Board, on
the basis of the record of the hearing
and the Regional Director's Intermediate
Report, makes its decision either dismiss-
ing the petition or certifying representa-
tives or taking such other action as seems
necessary.
A certification of representatives has
no enforceable effect. It is merely evi-
dence of a right to representation. The
employer is not bound by the decision nor
is any order issued against the employer.
Consequently there is no direct review in
the courts of the Board's certification of
representatives. If, however, the em-
ployer refuses to bargain collectively
with the representatives certified by the
Board, and the Board thereupon brings
an unfair labor practice proceeding
agaiist the employer based upon such re-
fusal, the employer may obtain a review
in the courts, not only of the record in
the unfair labor practice proceeding but
also of the record in the prior certifica-
tion proceeding.
It will be seen from the foregoing that
the Board is not endowed with law mak-
ing functions. Under the Act the Board's
powers are limited to the initial adjudi-
cation of controversies involving individ-
ual employers charged with violation of
law, and to the investigation and certifi-
cation of facts relating to the represen-
iation of employees. The problems of
fair hearing with which the Board is con-
cerned have therefore been confined to
these two types of administrative action.
During the three years of its existence
the Board has had ample opportunity to
consider certain major problems of fair
hearing. It need hardly be said that
counsel for employers have not been ret-
icent in urging upon the Board and upon
the courts alleged deficiencies in the
Board's procedure. Consequently it may
be assumed that in the three years of op-
eration thus far our attention has been
directed to most of the important ques-
tions of fair hearing which are likely to
affect employers appearing before the
Board. The same applies, perhaps to a
somewhat lesser degree, to our procedure
as it affects the rights of labor organiza-
tion.
First to be noted are various matters
which relate to questions of pleading.
To what extent must the complaint recite
in detail the alleged unfair labor prac-
tices? Under what circumstances is the
respondent entitled to a bill of particu-
lars? To what degree can the Board's
attorney amend the complaint during the
course of the hearing? If such an
amendment is made what notice is the
respondent entitled to for the purpose of
answering and preparing its defense?
To what extent is a variance between
pleadings and proof fatal to the validity
of the Board's order? To what extent
may the Board adopt a theory of the
case different from that alleged in the
complaint or pursued by the Board's at-
torney at the hearing?
Problems of this sort have been partic-
ularly acute during these first years of
the Board's operations. The legislation is
new. That body of specific interpreta-
tion and application of the more general
provisions of the Act-which grows up
around every statute-takes years to
work out. As time goes on, and as the
scope and implications of the Act become
clear, there will undoubtedly be less dif-
ficulty with pleading questions of this
sort.
However, even at the-initial stages of
the Board's operations, it seems to me
feasible to set up general rules of guid-
ance which, if intelligently and sympa-
thetically applied by the courts, should
assure the respondent in each case ade-
quate protection on issues of pleading.
A good illustration of such general prin-
ciples is furnished by the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in
National Labor Relations Board v.
Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.
S. 333, 58 S.Ct. 904, 82 L.Ed. 1381. The
facts in the case were these:
After a period of unsuccessful nego-
tiation between a labor organization
known as the American Radio Tele-
graphists Association and the Mackay
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Radio and Telegraph Company, the un-
ion ordered a strike of its members for
the purpose of enforcing its demands up-
on the compan.y. The strike was nation-
wide but the facts before the Board per-
tained only to the company's San Fran-
cisco office. There the strike soon prov-
ed unsuccessful and after several days
the employees reported back for work.
The company put most of the strikers
back to work but refused to take back
certain of the more active union leaders.
The Board issued a complaint alleging
that the respondent had "discharged and
refused to employ" the five men who
were not reinstated for the reason that
they had joined and assisted a labor or-
ganization, and that by such discharge
the respondent had discriminated in re-
gard to the hire and tenure of employ-
ment of such employees contrary to Sec-
tion 8 (1) and (3) of the Act. After
completion of its testimony the Board's
attorney filed an amended complaint to
conform with the evidence in which it
was alleged that the respondent had "re-
ftised to re-employ' the five men in ques-
tion for the reason that they had joined
and assisted a labor organization, and
that such refusal of reemployment con-
stituted discrimination in regard to hire
and tenure of employment contrary to
Section 8 (1) and (3) of the Act. The
respondent entered a general denial of
the amended complaint and then pre-
sented its evidence. The Board found
that the respondent refused to reinstate
to employment the five men, "thereby
discharging said employees," and by such
acts discriminated in regard to tenure of
employment contrary to Section 8 (1)
and (3) of the Act.
I may interject here that, when I read
this variety of words and then look down
and see Professor Cook, who taught me
common law pleading, sitting right here
before me, it does bring back old times
and make me wonder whether we are go-
ing to go through the kind of evolutions
which took place in common law plead-
ing in its classic day.
In the Circuit Court of Appeals and
in the Supreme Court the respondent
contended that the original complaint had
alleged a discrimination by discharging
five men; that after all the evidence was
in, this complaint was withdrawn and a
new one presented alleging that the re-
spondent had refused to reemploy the
five men; that the Board in its findings
had reverted to the original position that
the respondent had not failed to employ
but had discharged the employees; and
that thus the respondent was found
guilty of an unfair labor practice which
was not within the issues upon which the
case was tried. The Supreme Court re-
jected the respondent's contention and
laid down the applicable general principle
in the following terms:
"A review of the record shows that at
no time during the hearings was there
any misunderstanding as to what was
the basis of the Board's complaint. The
entire evidence, pro and con, was direct-
ed to the question whether, when the
strike failed and the men desired to come
back and were told that the strike would
be forgotten and that they might come
back in a body save for eleven men who
were singled out for different treatment,
six of whom, however, were treated like
everyone else, the respondent did in fact
discriminate against the remaining five
because of union activity. While the re-
spondent was entitled to know the basis
of the complaint against it, and to ex-
plain its conduct, in an effort to meet
that complaint, we find from the record
that it understood the issue and was af-
forded full opportunity to justify the ac-
tion of its officers as innocent rather than
discriminatory."
A somewhat similar question arose in
Consolidated Edison Co. v. National La-
bor Relations Board, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.
Ed. -, decided by the Supreme Court,
December 5, 1938. In that case the
Board had ordered the respondent not to
give effect to certain contracts which the
Board found had been entered into as
part of the respondent's unfair labor
practices. The respondent and the labor
organization adversely affected contend-
ed that the validity of the contracts was
not in issue in the Board's proceeding
and that the Board's order on this point
was therefore void. Although the mem-
The American Law School Review
bers of the court disagreed upon the ap-
plication of the rule there was no dis-
agreement that the governing principle in
the case was whether or not the issue of
the validity of the contracts had been
"actually litigated."
In general it may be said that the fore-
going problems of pleading with which
the Board has been concerned are not
materially different from those which
confront most other administrative agen-
cies having functions similar to those ex-
ercised by the National Labor Relations
Board. And, on the whole, it can be said
that general principles, such as those
enunciated by the Supreme Court in the
Mackay and Consolidated Edison deci-
sions, are equally applicable to the pro-
ceedings of such other administrative
agencies and can give full protection, on
matters of pleading, to the rights of par-
ties appearing before them.
A second series of questions with
which the Board has been concerned re-
lates to matters of evidence. As I have
stated, the National Labor Relations Act
provides that in proceedings before the
Board "the rules of evidence prevailing
in the courts of law or equity shall not
be controlling." This provision is simi-
lar to that appearing in other laws creat-
ing administrative agencies to handle the
initial enforcement of legislation. From
the point of view of swift and efficient
enforcement, in a proceeding where the
issues are presented not to a jury but to
a trained body of experts, there can be
no doubt of the wisdom of dispensing
with the requirement that the strict rules
of evidence be followed. Nevertheless,
such freedom in the acceptance of testi-
mony, especially when coupled with the
provision that the Board's findings of
fact if supported by evidence are'conclu-
sive, may well give rise to serious prob-
lems of fair hearing.
To what extent can the Board ignore
the hearsay rule? Should the Board ad-
here to the best evidence rule? Is it
proper for the Board's trial examiners to
permit leading questions on direct exam-
ination? May counsel impeach his own
witnesses? To what extent and under
what circumstances are employers enti-
tled to subpcena the records of a labor
organization? To what extent may the
trial examiner cut short examination or
participate in examination himself?
These are some of the questions which
frequently arise. It is impossible to con-
sider all of them in detail at this time,
but it may be worth while to discuss
briefly what is probably the most impor-
tant of them,-the hearsay rule:
It will readily be acknowledged that
most hearsay testimony has little or no
probative value. Nevertheless the Board
has not found it wise to exclude hearsay
evidence altogether. For one thing, many
of the witnesses before the Board have
not had the benefit of formal education
and are quite unaware of the significance
of various facts which may be relevant
to the proceeding. Consequently it is
often advisable for the trial examiner to
allow considerable leeway with respect to
hearsay upon the theory that it may in-
troduce or point the way to important
leads hitherto undeveloped. Again, tes-
timony which, though hearsay, is within
the power of the respondent to deny or
explain, but which is left uncontradicted
on the record, may under certain circum-
stances be reasonably relied upon as hav-
ing probative value.
I think of a situation of that kind.
John Smith has been discharged, as he
claims, for union activities. He says
that the company told him, when it dis-
charged him, that there was no more
work for him to do. He says that fellow
workers told him later, when he had no
access to the plant to find out for him-
self, that immediately upon his discharge
another man was put into his place and
the work went on.
Now, there you have a situation where
it is perfectly easy for the company to
show what the truth of the matter is.
So, if that hearsay is admitted and then
the company makes no response to it at
all, probably reasonable people would
have a right to assume that the truth was
in accordance with the hearsay.
In general, as I have said, the Board
adheres to the hearsay rule unless good
reason appears for making an exception
thereto. And in no case that I recall has
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the Board relied solely upon hearsay to
support an essential finding of fact.
What I have said is, I think, sufficient
to show the advisability of leaving the
Board free to admit hearsay evidence,
and to rely upon it where reasonable to
do so. The question before us is wheth-
er there can be laid down any general
rule, applicable by way of judicial re-
view, which would check the Board in
the event of extravagant use of hearsay
evidence. Necessarily such a rule would
have to be stated in broad terms, and its
application would have to vary with the
circumstances. Yet the guiding princi-
ples which, again if intelligently and sym-
pathetically applied, should afford ade-
quate protection against real abuse can
probably be stated. In National Labor
Relations Board v. Remington Rand,
Inc., 94 F.2d 862, the circuit court of
appeals for the second circuit (Learned
Hand, J.) has already attempted the
statement of such a principle:
"(The Trial Examiner) did indeed ad-
mit much that would have been exclud-
ed at common law, but the act specifically
so provides, Section 10(b), 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 160(b) ; no doubt, that does not mean
that mere rumor will serve to 'support'
a finding, but hearsay may do so, at
least if more is not conveniently avail-
able, and if in the end the. finding is sup-
ported by the kind of evidence on which
responsible persons are accustomed to
rely in serious affairs." (Italics sup-
plied.)
In the Consolidated Edison case the
Supreme Court stated a similar prin-
ciple, coupling it with the rule that the
Board's findings of fact must be sup-
ported not merely "by evidence" but by
"substantial" evidence:
"The companies contend that the Court
of Appeals misconceived its power to
review the findings and, instead of
searching the record to see if they were
sustained by 'substantial' evidence, mere-
ly considered whether the record was
'wholly barren of evidence' to support
them. We agree that the statute, in
providing that 'the findings of the Board
as to the facts, if supported by evidence,
shall be conclusive,' Section 10(e), 29
U.S.C.A. § 160(e), means supported by
substantial evidence. Washington, Vir-
ginia & Maryland Coach Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142,
147, 57 S.Ct. 648, 650, 81 L.Ed. 965.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evi-
dence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion. Ap-
palachian Electric Power Co. v. Nation-
al Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F.
2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations
Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97
F.2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting
Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2
Cir., 98 F.2d 758, 760. We do not think
that the Court of Appeals intended to
apply a different test. In saying that the
record was not 'wholly barren of evi-
dence' to sustain the finding of discrim-
ination, we think that the court referred
to substantial evidence. Ballston-Still-
water Knitting Co. v. National Labor
Relations board, supra.
"The companies urge that the Board
received 'remote hearsay' and 'mere ru-
mor.' The statute provides that 'the
rules of evidence prevailing in courts of
law and equity shall not be controlling.'
The obvious purpose of this and similar
provisions is to free administrative
boards from the compulsion of technical
rules so that the mere admission of mat-
ter which would be deemed incompetent
in judicial proceedings would not invali-
date the administrative order. Inter-
state Commerce Commission v. Baird,
194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S.Ct. 563, 568, 48
L.Ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Com-
mission v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.,
227 U.S. 88, 93, 33 S.Ct. 185, 187, 57
L.Ed. 431; United States v. Abilene &
Southern Ry. Co., 265 U.S. 274, 288, 44
S.Ct. 565, 569, 68 L.Ed. 1016; Tagg
Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280
U.S. 420, 442, 50 S.Ct. 220, 225, 74 L.
Ed. 524. But this assurance of a de-
sirable flexibility in administrative pro-
cedure does not go so far as to justify
orders without a basis in evidence having
rational probative force. Mere uncor-
roborated hearsay or rumor does not con-
stitute substantial evidence." (Italics
supplied.)
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In certain important respects the prob-
lems of evidence with which the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board deals are pe-
culiar to the field of labor relations and
the application of the foregoing prin-
ciples must be made with these peculiari-
ties in mind. Thus, as I have said, the
absence of formal education on the part
of most witnesses appearing in Board
proceedings has an important bearing
upon the application of the hearsay rule
and upon the advisability of permitting
leading questions. So, too, to mention
but one more example, the need of a
labor organization to keep its member-
ship and activity concealed from a hos-
tile employer is of extreme significance
in determining the extent to which an
employer may be permitted to inspect
union books and records. I think it
may safely be said, however, that the
foregoing rule, which necessarily must be
stated in general language, can serve
equally well as the guiding principle for
other administrative agencies making de-
terminations of fact. Variances between
agencies, such as have been pointed out
above, can be normally taken care of in
the application of the rule to the circum-
stances of the particular case.
A third problem of importance has
been the question whether a fair hearing
requires the issuance of an Intermediate
Report by the trial examiner or, in lieu
thereof, the issuance of proposed find-
ings of fact by the Board, with the op-
portunity to file exceptions thereto and
argue orally before the Board. After
the decision of the Supreme Court in the
second Morgan case (Morgan v. United
States, 304 U.S. 1, 23, 58 S.Ct. 773, 999,
82 L.Ed. 1129) it was contended that
the Board's procedure was fatally defec-
tive in a few cases where it had dis-
pensed with the trial examiner's report
and had not issued proposed findings of
fact. This contention was answered by
the Supreme Court in the Mackay case
and again in the Consolidated Edison
case. In the Mackay case the court
said:
"At the conclusion of the testimony,
and prior to oral argument before the
examiner, the Board transferred the pro-
ceeding to Washington to be further
heard before the Board. It denied re-
spondent's motion to resubmit the cause
to the trial examiner with directions to
prepare and file an intermediate report.
In the Circuit Court of Appeals the
respondent assigned error to this ruling.
It appears that oral argument was had
and a brief was filed with the Board
after which it made its findings of fact
and conclusions of law. The respondent
now asserts that the failure of the Board
to follow its usual practice of the sub-
mission of a tentative report by the trial
examiner and a hearing on exceptions to
that report deprived the respondent of
opportunity to call to the Board's atten-
tion the alleged fatal variance between
the allegations of the complaint and the
Board's findings. What we have said
sufficiently indicates that the issues and
contentions of the parties were clearly
defined and as no other detriment or dis-
advantage is claimed to have ensued from
the Board's procedure the matter is not
one calling for a reversal of the order.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees no
particular form of procedure; it pro-
tects substantial rights. Compare Mor-
gan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 478,
56 S.Ct. 906, 910, 80 L.Ed. 1288. The
contention that the respondent was de-
nied a full and adequate hearing must
be rejected."
In the Consolidated Edison case, in re-
sponse to a similar contention that the
lack of an Intermediate Report or pro-
posed findings constituted, a denial of a
fair hearing, the Supreme Court stated:
"It cannot be said that the Board did
not consider the evidence or the petition-
ers' brief or failed to make its own find-
ings in the light of that evidence and ar-
gument. It would have been better prac-
tice for the Board to have directed the
examiner to make a tentative report
with an opportunity for exceptions and
argument thereon. But, aside from the
question of the Brotherhood contracts,
we find no basis for concluding that the
issues and contentions were not clearly
defined and that the petitioning compa-
nies were not fully advised of them.
National Labor Relations Board v.
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Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.
S. 333, 350, 351, 58 S.Ct. 904, 912, 82
L.Ed. 1381. The points raised as to the
lack of procedural due process in this
relation cannot be sustained."
On this question of the Intermediate
Report and proposed findings the con-
siderations applicable to the Board's
procedure would seem to apply generally
to any administrative agency having
comparable procedure. In other words,
in any administrative proceeding where a
specific complaint is issued which de-
fines the issues and apprises the respond-
ent of them, it would seem clear that a
fair hearing does not require an Inter-
mediate Report or proposed findings. It
is to be noted, however, that the Chief
Justice in the Consolidated Edison case
expressed the opinion that the issuance
of an Intermediate Report by the trial
examiner, or presumably the issuance of
proposed findings in lieu thereof, would
be "better practice," and, in fact, the
Board has, since the decision in the sec-
ond Morgan case, adopted the policy in
unfair labor practice cases of issuing
proposed findings whenever the trial ex-
aminer, for whatever reason, does not
prepare an Intermediate Report.
It does not follow from the foregoing,
however, that an Intermediate Report is
"better practice" in every type of admin-
istrative proceeding. Thus somewhat
different considerations apply in pro-
ceedings before the Board for deter-
mination of representatives. There the
factor of speed is more important than in
the normal unfair labor practice case. It
is vital, from the viewpoint both of avert-
ing industrial strife and of assuring to
employees the full rights guaranteed by
the Act, that the determination of repre-
sentatives proceed with dispatch. Fur-
thermore, as stated abo~Ve, the Board's
representation proceedings result mere-
ly in a certification of fact and not in an
order binding upon the employer or up-
on anyone else. Consequently the Board,
in the interest of promptness, dispenses
with the Intermediate Report in a rep-
resentation case, both after the initial
hearing and after the hearing upon ob-
jections to the ballot, if one is held. If
the Board could be concerned only with
giving the parties all possible procedural
protection an Intermediate Report could
be provided fur in such situations. But
to do so would afford the parties only a
slight additional procedural benefit while
at the same time materially impairing
important substantive rights guaranteed
under the Act. Under such circum-
stances it would not seem that the gen-
eral principles of a fair hearing would
recommend the procedure of an Inter-
mediate Report or proposed findings.
Finally, there is another problem of
fair hearing which has been raised in
connection with the Board's procedure
but which has thus far not been finally
disposed of by the courts. Some of the
respondents in cases decided by the
Board, relying principally upon the sec-
ond Morgan decision, have contended
that they have the right, as a matter of
determining the fair hearing issue, to
inquire into the Board's internal oper-
ations with a view to discovering whether
the Board itself has considered the evi-
dence and made its own findings, or
whether those functions were improperly
delegated to subordinates. This ques-
tion has normally been raised by plead-
ings before the Circuit Court of Appeals
alleging on information and belief that
the Board members themselves did not
consider or appraise the evidence or did
not make the findings of fat which were
issued as the Board's decision. Such
pleading has usually been supplemented
by a motion to require the Board mem-
bers and others to answer interroga-
tories, or a motion to take depositions of
the Board members and others, or both.
The considerations which should be
determinative of this issue in so far as
the National Labor Relations Board is
concerned, seem to me equally applica-
ble to all administrative agencies which
have the function of adjudication, and in
fact to the courts themselves. And it
can scarcely be doubted that the issue is
a vital one in judicial procedure. A
somewhat similar inquiry into the func-
tioning of the Secretary of Agriculture in
the Morgan case occupied several days
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of trial. In the case of a court or board
which makes hundreds of adjudications
during a year, if a litigant in each case
could, upon allegations based on infor-
mation and belief, subject the court or
board to an inquisition as to its methods,
its work would be seriously impaired.
Without going into the issues further it
seems clear to me that if the procedure
of an administrative agency makes pro-
vision for a complaint which defines the
issues, for an Intermediate Report or
proposed findings which redefine the is-
sues after hearing, and for an oral argu-
ment, or opportunity for oral argument
before the agency itself, the requirements-
of fair hearing do not permit an inquiry
into the internal operations of the ad-
ministrative agency, at least in the ab-
sence of specific allegations of fraud.
In conclusion, I may perhaps be per-
mitted to repeat what I have already
stressed. With the expansion of ad-
ministrative procedure into numerous
fields of government operations, I con-
ceive it to be of vital importance to de-
velop general principles, such as rules
implementing the requirement of fair
hearing, which will serve to prevent
abuse of the administrative process. On
the whole I believe that satisfactory prin-
ciples broadly applicable to the procedure
of the various administrative agencies
can be worked out. However, these
principles will of necessity be general in
nature, and their application to specific
circumstances must depend upon the
factors governing the particular situa-
tion. In the end they will serve their
purpose only if they are applied with a
sympathetic grasp of the functions of
the administrative process and an in-
telligent understanding of the problems
to be solved.
CHESTER T. LANE
General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission
Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Association of American Law Schools:
I must tell you at the outset that'I do
not propose to, indeed I cannot, answer
this question entirely responsively. For
me to try to set the limit beyond which
fairness cannot go, to try to define the
wide variety of administrative tribunals
and administrative proceedings to which
any given set of rules of fairness must
be applicable, would be to assume a
breadth of experience and a certainty of
knowledge to which I have no claim. To
me, administration, and administrative
law, are very broad terms, used to cov-
er one general present-day aspect of the
continuing socio-legal system which we
have inherited and under which we are
now living. I can not follow the popu-
lar use of these words to convey con-
demnation of a supposedly new type of
bureaucracy, a New Deal oddity invent-
ed in political desperation to gloss over
governmental ineptitude by concentrat-
ing public attention on the evils of big
business. Administrative action is not,
as many critics would have it, a servant
girl recently hired from the neighboring
employment agency, of uncertain ante-
cedents and doubtful utility in the house-
hold, to be praised or criticized, educat-
ed or restrained to the end that she may
be made worth her wages, and finally to
be discharged without a character if she
does not live up to her references.
It is too little understood that admin-
istrative law, even though the develop-
ment of its techniques may be but an-
other phase of the servant problem, is
no newcomer in our midst. Admin-
istrative law is an honorable and legiti-
mate product of the permanent relation-
ship between organized society and the
individual, with an ancestry in the direct
line going back many decades. We are
all familiar with the process by which
over centuries the demands of an ex-
panding society induced the conscience
of the chancellor to implement the rigid
forms of the common law by the more
flexible and humanistic procedures and
doctrines of equity. By a process of de-
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velopment in many ways parallel, our
modern administrative law is a product
of the conflict between the conventions
of judicial procedure and the needs of an
ever-increasingly complex industrial so-
ciety. I have no thought of tracing the
history of this conflict-that is for the
legal historians; but I do assert that a
realistic view of the problems of admin-
instrative law today requires an under-
standing that those problems are not
antochthonous nor even of recent birth.
The conflict from which they arose has
been going on for nearly a century, and
almost every issue now discussed was
raised long before 1933.
This point may be well illustrated by
examining the course of affairs which
led, in the heat and frayed emotions of
the summer of 1914, to the creation of
the Federal Trade Commission. On
January 24, 1914, just after President
Wilson had proposed his legislative pro-
gram, there appeared in the columns of
the New York Times this dispatch (page
11, column 1) :
"C. Stuart Patterson, banker and di-
rector of the Pennsylvania Railroad,
and ex-attorney general William Hensel
united tonight in condemning
the Wilson anti-trust legislation in ad-
dresses before the Terrapin Club.
"'A revolution is going on,' said Mr.
Patterson, 'and it will go still further.
• . . This vexatious interference
with business is dangerous to the whole
people. It affrights capital and halts in-
vestment; and in turn, it hurts labor.
When this interfering legislation is en-
acted, the man of wealth is able to look
after himself, but the man who depends
upon his weekly wage is the one who
suffers. So this becomes class legisla-
tion.
" 'You cannot in justice create ad-
versity for one class and prosperity for
another. Every class must be treated
alike.
. . .Sober sense will call a
halt on the interference of little Politics
with Big Business, and there will be a
demand for legislation that will put all
men on a common equality.
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"'If it is proper to legislate good
wages for the shop girl, it is also iniqui-
tous to impose a starvation income upon
railroads. And if it is wrong for busi-
ness interests to form combinations to
regulate prices and protect their business,
then it is equally unlawful for labor to
combine to dictate to capital'."
Not unexpectedly the National Associa-
tion of Clothiers, the Chamber of Com-
merce, the Merchants' Association of
New York, and the editorial columns of
the various newspapers joined the chorus
of protest.
Criticism of the President's legislative
program was finally centered against the
proposal to entrust the Federal Trade
Commission with functions of investiga-
tion and decision. The Commission, it
was said, might be satisfactory if it did
no more than make recommendations to
Congress, if, like the old and useless
Bureau of Corporations, its functions
were limited to "appeals to reason and
publicity." One bitter opponent of the
Federal Trade Commission declared that
the proposed administrative body's "ef-
ficiency is that of a monarchy . . .
and has no place whatever in a democra-
cy". New York Times, 8-17-14; page
12. And Representative Montague stat-
ed at the hearings before the Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
(page 80): "Your bill proceeds on the
theory . . . that the division of this
government into three branches
should be practically abolished
and the rights of the individual should
not be considered. . . . Does not
your bill . . . go back 400 or 500
years to the old days of tyranny?"
The parallel is obvious. The newspapers
told of the bitter fight between govern-
ment and "big business." Business de-
manded a cessation of governmental in-
terference that it might have a "breath-
ing spell." President Wilson accused
business of creating a "psychological de-
pression" to defeat his legislative aims.
But the Federal Trade Commission was
created and there is little suggestion to-
day that it be abolished.
In thus recalling historical parallels
I am far from suggesting futility in the
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discussion of problems of administrative
law. For even though no problem be a
new one, there can be no doubt that the
expansion of administrative functions in
recent years has given new importance to
the role of the administrator which de-
mands the most careful reexamination
even of old problems which appear to
have been solved. We have passed many
years from the days when the Interstate
Commerce Commission, narrow as its
powers were, stood out in solitary promi-
nence as a Federal administrative agen-
cy. As Professor Gardner points out in
his piquant review of Dean Landis' book
on "The Administrative Process," we
now have: "the Interstate Commerce
Commission, which more and more gov-
erns transportation and travel, the Fed-
eral Reserve Board, which more and
more governs banking, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, which tries to
govern all our investments, the Federal
Trade Commission, which tries to gov-
ern the marketing of our manufactures,
the National Labor Relations Board,
which interferes in the making of these
manufactures, the Reconstruction Fi-
nance Corporation, which taxes all of us
to lend to whom it thinks fitting, and the
Tennessee Valley Authority, which taxes
all of us to make over that valley accord-
ing td the hopes of a few gentlemen's
hearts." 52 Harv.L.Rev. 336, 338
(1938).
This expansion of the administrative
process has undoubtedly caused severe
anguish of soul to many sincere men
besides Professor Gardner; but un-
doubtedly it has also been bitterly fought
by many whose articulate distress mark-
ed only self-interest and callous uncon-
cern with public needs.
In spite of the intense conflict which
has regularly attended the growth of the
administrative process, I suppose there
are few informed persons who will not
in all honesty admit that the administra-
tive commission is not merely a useful
handmaiden, but an indispensable agent
of modern democratic government.
Even Professor Gardner concludes, al-
though indefinitely, that "they are very
good things to work for us-provided we
can afford the expense of them-but
that they are very bad things to rule
our lives." Nevertheless, at least those
of us whose business is administrative
law are fully aware that neither design
nor function in administration has been
finally perfected; and criticism even
from prejudiced sources may be help-
ful, particularly criticism of, administra-
tive methods and procedures. For un-
certainties and differences in procedural
methods, and in the administrative poli-
cies which shape those methods, are ir-
ritating and may even be oppressive. In-
deed, their effect may be to weaken re-
spect for the whole administrative proc-
ess.
With the thought of inviting your
comment and criticism, I propose, not to
respond definitely to the question before
me, but to try to give you a picture of
the salient outlines of procedure in the
one agency of the government with
whose work I am closely familiar, the
Securities and Exchange Commission. I
recognize that conditions in one agency
may differ widely from those in another,
and that the techniques we have adopted
in our effort to assure administrative fair
play might be entirely inadequate to the
problem of administrative bodies charged
with the enforcement of other types of
statutes. However, the Securities and
Exchange Commission itself is by now
far from being a simple organism; with
the steady increase of its statutory ju-
risdiction it has undertaken the conduct
of almost every type of proceeding
known to administrative law. Our Com-
mission, it seems to me, affords an ad-
mirable opportunity for clinical study of
the question which has been posed.
As you are very likely aware, the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission ad-
ministers three statutes: the Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77a et seq.,
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C.A. § 78 a et seq., and the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,
15 U.S.C.A. § 79 et seq. Our advisory
functions under Chapter X of the Bank-
ruptcy Act may for present purposes be
disregarded. Each of these statutes is
regulatory in character, and the subject
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matter of each is business-the distribu-
tion of securities, mechanics and prac-
tices of securities markets, and the man-
agement of gas and electric utility hold-
ing companies. Each of these statutes
confers power upon the Commission to
promulgate rules and regulations of gen-
eral applicability and legal effect, pre-
scribing in every instance appropriate
standards for the guidance of the Com-
mission. This rule making power in it-
self raises questions for discussion,
among the more interesting of which is
whether hearings, on notice to interested
groups of the community, are necessary
or appropriate to the exercise of this es-
sentially legislative function. I propose,
however, to limit my inquiry to the or-
der making power. For under each of
the statutes the Commission may, after
notice and hearing, issue final orders,
which adjudicate the rights and liabilities
of individuals and companies with the
force and effect of law, and which are
reviewable by the appellate courts in
much the same manner as final judg-
ments of courts of first instance. It is
the fairness of hearings in proceedings
culminating in such quasi-judicial or-
ders that I assume forms the principal
subject matter of this discussion.
As I said, the work of the Securities
and Exchange Commission involves a
wide variety of types of proceedings cul-
minating in final quasi-judicial orders.
From a procedural point of view, how-
ever, there has been developed within
the Commission a rather clear line of de-
marcation between two broad classes of
proceedings: one, actions of a prosecu-
tory nature instituted by the Commission
itself with a view to the suspension of
some privilege, either pending compli-
ance with law or as a penalty for its in-
fraction, and the other, actions begun by
formal application of private parties to
secure from the Commission the grant of
some privilege or relief from some statu-
tory prohibition. These classifications
are not water-tight, but I propose to ac-
cept them for purposes of discussion.
For purposes of convenient distinction
.I will call the former adversary proceed-
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ings, and the latter administrative pro-
ceedings.
Typical of adversary proceedings are
stop order proceedings under the Securi-
ties Act to suspend the effectiveness of
a registration statement, and proceedings
under the Securities Exchange Act to
suspend the registration of a security
listed on a national securities exchange.
Typical of administrative proceedings
are applications under the Securities Ex-
change Act for the extension of unlisted
trading privileges on national securities
exchanges, and applications under the
Public Utility Holding Company Act for
exemption from the restrictions imposed
by the statute upon the applicant as a
holding company or as a subsidiary com-
pany, or for authority to issue or acquire
securities or utility assets. It may be
fielpful to consider in detail one example
of each class: the stop order proceeding
under the Securities Act, and the applica-
tion for authority to issue securities-
the declaration-under the Public Utility
Holding Company Act.
Briefly stated, the purpose of the Se-
curities Act is to protect the investor
against fraudulent or unethical practices
in the sale of securities. This protection
is in part achieved by means of injunc-
tions and criminal sanctions against
fraud in the sale of securities, through
the mails or in interstate commerce.
These sanctions are enforced only by
the courts on application and proper
showing by the Commission or, in the
case of criminal proceedings, by the At-
torney General. tut the Act also con-
tains prophylactic provisions-provisions
designed to protect the investing public
from misrepresentation or concealment
by requiring full disclosure of all facts
bearing materially upon the value of se-
curities sold through the mails or any
other instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce. To achieve this end, Section 5
(a) of the Act provides, with certain ex-
ceptions, that no security may be offered,
sold, or delivered after sale, through the
mails or in interstate commerce, unless
there is in effect as to such security a
"registration statement" describing the
security and the issuer in appropriate de-
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tail. Under Section 8 (a) a registration
statement, in the absence of amendment
by the issuer or action by the Commis-
sion postponing the effective date, be-
comes effective automatically upon the
twentieth day after its filing with the
Commission.
Although the Commission has no au-
thority under the Act to approve or dis-
approve of securities, or in any way to
pass upon their merits, the role of the
Commission in connection with registra-
tion statements is not a passive one. Un-
less the Commission were empowered to
examine into the truth and completeness
of a registration statement, and to re-
quire the correction of false or inade-
quate data, the purposes of the Act
would fall far short of achievement.
Section 8 (d) of the Act therefore don-
fers upon the Commission the duty of
suspending the effectiveness of any reg-
istration statement which, after notice
and hearing, is found to contain ma-
terial misstatements or omissions. Spe-
cifically, that section provides as fol-
lows:
If it appears to the Commission at
any time that the registration statement
includes any untrue statement of a ma-
terial fact or omits to state any material
fact required to be stated therein or nec-
essary to make the statements therein not
misleading, the Commission may, after
notice by personal service or the sending
of confirmed telegraphic notice, and after
opportunity for hearing (at a time fixed
by the Commission) within fifteen days
after such notice by personal service or
the sending of such telegraphic notice, is-
sue a stop order suspending the effective-
ness of the registration statement.
When such statement has been amended
in accordance with such stop order the
Commission shall so declare and there-
upon the stop order shall cease to be
effective.
It will be seen that to some extent
the statute itself prescribes procedural
details to be followed in the institution
and conduct of stop order proceedings.
The statutory requirements, however,
are of the broadest, and have necessarily,
and I believe appropriately, been imple-
mented by general Rules of Practice, ap-
plicable to all proceedings alike. These-
Rules of Practice embody, at least in
part, the Commission's own self-imposed
standards of judicial self-limitation.
The proceeding for a stop order is be-
gun after examination of the registration
statement by an examining group in the
Registration Division of the Commission.
If the Registration Division concludes
that the statement is materially false or
misleading, authorization for a hearing
under Section 8 (d) is sought from the
Commission. Thereupon, if the Com-
mission agrees that the registration state-
ment does not appear to comply with the-
statutory standards of disclosure, con-
firmed telegraphic notice of opportunity
for hearing within fifteen days is sent to.
the registrant together with a "Statement
of Matters to be Considered" in the na-
ture of a detailed bill of particulars..
The Rules of Practice specifically pro-
vide that:
"Such notice shall state the time and
place of hearing and shall include a state-
ment of the items in the registration
statement by number or name which ap-
pear to be incomplete or inaccurate in.
any material respect, or to include any
untrue statement of a material fact, or to
omit a statement of any material fact
required to be stated therein or neces-
sary to make the statement therein not
misleading. Such notice shall be given
either by personal service or by con-
firmed telegraphic notice a reasonable
time in advance of the hearing. The per-
sonal notice or the confirmation of tele-
graphic notice shall be accompanied by
a short and simple statement of the mat-
ters and items specified to be considered
and determined." Rule III(b).
In the proceeding the Commission is
represented by an attorney from the staff
of the Registration Division, which in
judicial analogy may be regarded as the
plaintiff. The hearing is public in char-
acter and held before a trial examiner*
designated by the Commission; all tes-
timony is stenographically reported and
made part of the record; copies of the
transcript are made available to all par-
ties to the proceeding. Trial examiners
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as a matter of internal organization are
not subordinated to any official other
than the Commission itself, and the Reg-
istration Division has no voice in the
selection of a trial examiner for any
particular case. At the conclusion of
the hearing each party (which term, as I
am using it, includes the Registration
Division) may then file with the trial
examiner "statement in writing in terse
outline setting forth such party's request
for specific findings, which may be ac-
companied by a brief in support there-
of". Rule IX (e), Rules of Practice.
Both the requested findings and the sup-
porting briefs are also served upon all
parties. Ten days after the receipt of
the transcript of testimony the trial ex-
.aminer is required by the Commission's
Rules of Practice to file with the Secre-
tary of the Commission an advisory re-
port containing his findings of fact,
copies of which are immediately trans-
mitted to each party. Within five days
.after receipt of the report exceptions
may be taken to the findings proposed by
the trial examiner, to his failure to make
findings, or to the omission or exclusion
of evidence. Briefs may be filed in sup-
port of such exceptions, and, upon writ-
ten request of any party, oral argu-
ment may be had before the Com-
mission. Thereafter the entire rec-
.ord, including a transcript of the oral
argument before the Commission, if such
.argument was requested, is transmitted
to the Commission's General Counsel,
whose office is as a matter of internal or-
ganization entirely separate and distinct
from the Registration Division, for con-
sideration and the preparation of an ap-
propriate opinion containing the neces-
sary findings in support of a stop order,
or dismissing the proceeding. The ac-
tual drafting is done by attorneys in the
Opinion Section of the General Coun-
sel's Office, under the guidance of an As-
sistant General Counsel and a Super-
vising Attorney. The draftsmen are
under strict instructions not to confer
with the trial examiner or with trial
counsel in the Registration Division. In
the initial stages the draftsmen, as like
.as not, have only the most general inti-
mation of the Commission's tentative
viewpoint or approach to the case. The
first draft of the opinion is thus pre-
pared on the basis of the record itself,
without conference with any party to the
proceeding, and without pressure or sug-
gestion from any source outside of the
Commission and the General Counsel's
Office. Copies of the draft opinion are
circulated among the members of the
Commission for individual consideration,
and later the opinion is called for joint
discussion among the draftsmen and the
Commissioners in Commission meeting.
By that time each Commissioner is fa-
miliar with the record, has read the pro-
posed opinion, has reached some decision
in his own mind, and is prepared to dis-
cuss the issues and offer suggestions as
to the form and content of the opinion.
I admit frankly that in most cases the
opinion is not acceptable in its first draft
and must be rewritten in accordance with
the matured conclusions of the Commis-
sion. Occasionally a completely new
opinion, or even alterative opinions, must
be prepared. If a Commissioner dissents
from the determination of the majority,
he will himself ordinarily write a dis-
senting opinion containing the reasons
for his dissent.
I take it that this procedure is "fair,"
"proper," and "judicial" under any deci-
sion heretofore rendered by the Supreme
Court, and indeed goes far beyond the
current judicial requirements of due
process. The position of the trial exam-
iner, however, deserves further consid-
eration. In many agencies, at least, ad-
judication is now largely centered in the
trial examiner. The rules of procedure
are formulated chiefly for the hearings
before him. In a real sense he is becom-
ing a lower administrative tribunal, and
the regulatory authority is itself in fact,
if not in theory, becoming a tribunal of
second instance. Should this be clearly
recognized and written into the law? I
suggest the possibility that there may be
enough likeness between the judicial
functions of the trial examiners in the
various regulatory agencies, to justify
placing them by law or Executive Order
on a unified basis. Many questions must
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be answered, however, before progress
can be made. The following questions
have been asked, not with reference to
the Securities, and Exchange Commis-
sion specifically, but with reference to
trial examiners generally. "Should trial
examiners be under the Civil Service?
Should they have specialized training in
the field of economics with which they
are respectively concerned, as well as in
the field of law? Should they make real
decisions, such as are made by the indi-
vidual members of the Board of Tax
Appeals? Should their decisions be giv-
en to the contesting parties, who shall
have a right to take exceptions to them?
If exceptions are taken should the case
then be heard by the Board or Commis-
sion? In case no exceptions are taken
should the case be considered as closed
by the Commission? Should the trial
examiners continue to be the mere agents
of the Board or Commission, or should
they be given a more independent status?
Should the principle be further developed
that all cases of a regulatory nature be
heard de novo before trial examiners, or
should certain cases be reserved to the
Commission itself? Should the Commis-
sion have the right to call up any case
pending before trial examiners for its
own consideration ?" See Blachly, Work-
ing Papers on Administrative Adjudica-
tion, page 3.
Other questions arise regarding the
scope of his activities. At the present
time the report of the trial examiner for
the Securities and Exchange Commission
includes only findings of fact together
with a recommendation for action. There
is no statement of the principles of law
involved. The Rules of Practice pro-
vide, moreover, that the "report shall be
advisory only, and the findings of fact
therein contained shall not be binding up-
on the Commission." So far as our
Commission is concerned, this provision
is taken seriously; the record in each
case is reexamined meticulously by the
impartial Opinion Section of the General
Counsel's Office, and reconsidered by the
Commissioners, and only such weight is
given to the trial examiner's report as in
the particular case it-appears to deserve.
This practice, however, adequate as it
may be to assure fair and impartial treat-
ment to the respondent, suggests a real
necessity for reexamination of the func-
tions of the trial examiner. If the Com-
mission is free wholly to disregard the
trial examiner's report, it may be ques-
tioned whether the report adequately
serves one of its most important sup-
posed functions, that of notifying the
parties of the issues involved. The is-
sues discussed in such a report may not
be the issues which move the Commis-
sion. Exceptions and argument directed
to a report which has no binding quality
may be futile. One alternative, there-
fore, might be to eliminate the trial ex-
aminer's report altogether, or at least to
utilize it merely as a confidential docu-
ment for the Commission's assistance in
analyzing the record.
However, although the Mackay Radio
& Telegraph Co. case (304 U.S. 333, 58
S.Ct. 904, 82 L.Ed. 1381) shows that the
trial examiner's report is not a sine qua
non of administrative fairness, its value
in this regard is clearly suggested by the
opinion of the Supreme Court in the sec-
ond Morgan case (304 U.S. 1, 58 S.Ct.
773, 999, 82 L.Ed. 1129), and it may well
be doubted whether further limitation of
the trial examiner's functions would ful-
ly exploit the advantages in the trial ex-
aminer device. Serious consideration
might therefore be given to the possibil-
ity, as an alternative solution, of giving
to trial examiners greater authority in
the making of their reports and findings,
with power to write their decisions into
intermediate orders which, unless except-
ed to by one side or the other, would be-
come the final orders of the Commission.
I do not urge such a solution, but it is
at least one that cannot be disregarded.
I am aware that existing statutory pro-
visions may not permit such a delegation
of authority by administrative agencies,
but as one commentator has recently
pointed out, "Legislative draftsmen con-
tinue to copy slavishly the procedural
provisions of old statutes, since they have
no means of determining how those pro-
visions can be improved." Feller, Pro-
spectus for the Further Study of Federal
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(1938). It is conceivable that our expe-
rience may crystallize into concrete sug-
gestions for statutory improvement, at
least for future statutes. I also recog-
nize that merely conferring the powers
of a judge upon men who have no com-
petence for judging, by no means solves
the problem. There is much weight in
the current criticism that trial examiners
are too frequently yes-men for the com-
missions they serve, and in Dean Lan-
dis's statement that "Today trial exam-
iners' staffs on the whole have too little
competence." Landis, The Administra-
tive Process, page 104. However, we
must at least recognize that if we are to
retain the trial examiner, improvement
cannot be secured by lessened responsi-
bility and continued impairment of func-
tion, but only by greater responsibility
and higher standards of personnel.
Now let me describe somewhat more
briefly an example of what I have re-
ferred to as administrative proceedings.
Section 6 (a) of the Public Utility Hold-
ing Company Act provides that it shall
be unlawful to issue or sell any security
except in accordance with a declaration
effective under Section 7 and with an or-
der under Section 7 permitting such dec-
laration to become effective. Section 7
describes the information which must be
included in the declaration and lays down
standards to guide the Commission in de-
termining whether or not the declaration
shall be permitted to become effective.
A declaration upon filing is submitted at
once to an examining group in the Pub-
lic Utilities Division. Amendments may
then be called for to clarify or amplify
the information originally submitted;
conferences are often held between the
management and the Commission's staff,
and finally the matter is set down for
hearing. Since the proceeding is insti-
tuted by the declarant, he is of course
fully aware of the questions to be con-
sidered; the notice of hearing, therefore,
merely states the time of the hearing, the
place, and the subject matter. Rule XII
(a). The hearing, like a hearing in a
stop order proceeding, is held before a
trial examiner designated by the Coin-
mission, and the Commission is repre-
sented by attorneys from the staff of the
Public Utilities Division. The trial ex-
aminer does not prepare any report, but
within five days after the transcript of
testimony is filed with the Secretary of
the Commission,. any party may submit
requests for specific findings, together
with supporting briefs, copies of which
are immediately served upon all parties to
the proceeding. Fifteen days after re-
quests are filed for specific findings, ple-
nary briefs may be filed in support of all
contentions and exceptions. Upon writ-
ten request, moreover, oral argument
may be had before the Commission. The
case is then submitted to the Commission
"on the moving papers, the transcript of
the testimony and exhibits received at the
hearing, requests for specific findings, if
any, the briefs of the parties and counsel
to the Commission, if any, and oral argu-
ment before the Commission, if any."
Rule XII (b).
Frequently the applicant chooses to
submit his case on the declaration with-
out hearing and without further evi-
dence. In such case an attorney for the
Public Utilities Division appears before
the trial examiner on the date set for
hearing, offers the formal papers and the
declaration in evidence, and closes the
record without trial. Ordinarily these
are cases in which the staff of the Public
Utilities Division are satisfied that the
proposed issue complies with statutory
standards, and are prepared to recom-
mend that the declaration be declared ef-
fective. The draft opinion, under these
circumstances, is prepared by the trial
attorney, and thereafter submitted to the
Commission for consideration and cor-
rection. If the case is contested, how-
ever, or if adverse action, or qualified
approval, is proposed by the Public Util-
ities Division, the matter is transmitted
to the office of the General Counsel
where the findings and opinion are pre-
pared by an independent attorney in the
Opinion Section and the case proceeds as
if it were a stop order proceeding or
some other adversary proceeding.
In my opinion the procedures followed
by the Commission in both adversary and
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administrative proceedings, as I have
called them, are more than adequate to
meet all sensible demands of due process
or of ordinary fair play. Regardless of
whether a trial examiner's report is used,
the issues in each case are clearly deline-
ated by the statutory requirements, the
rules and regulations of the Commis-
sion, and the forms provided by the
Commission; the position of the Com-
mission's staff on any particular matter
is plainly disclosed not merely by confer-
ence, hearing, and cross-examination, but
by the proposed findings of fact, briefs,
and oral argument; the Commission's
final decision is based upon its own inde-
pendent consideration of the case, with
the assistance of a qualified and impartial
group of attorneys in every case of real
or threatened disagreement between the
Commission and the respondent or appli-
cant. Moreover, the petition for rehear-
ing is available to offset error or sur-
prise in final adjudication. Rule XII
(d).
In thus outlining to you in specific de-
tail the procedure followed by the Com-
mission in two of its commonest types
of proceedings, I should be disingenuous
if I left you with the implication that
prelcisely the same devices of procedure
are followed in all proceedings before the
Commission. As I have said, our Com-
mission deals with a wide variety of
quasi-judicial proceedings, each of which,
for its most efficient dispatch, may re-
quire a different 'technique. Further-
more, administrative law in its very na-
ture is itself flexible, designed primarily
for the purpose of affording relief from
the rigidity of judicial forms. And per-
haps even more important from the point
of our Commission, the Commission it-
self is young-young in experience,
young in years, even young in the years
of its members and its staff. I am proud
to say that no practice of the Commis-
sion can yet be regarded as immutable,
that the Commission itself is constantly
reexamining and criticizing its own pro-
cedure, and readjusting it to bring it into
closer conformity with the high stand-
ards of efficiency, fair play and public
interest which the Commission has set
before it.
Thus far I have confined myself to the
administrative practice of the Commis-
sion itself, without regard to the protec-
tive features afforded by the possibility
of judicial review. Under each of our
statutes, any person aggrieved by an or-
der of the Commission may obtain judi-
cial review of such order in the Circuit
Court of Appeals by filing in the appro-
priate court, within sixty days after the
entry of the order, 'a written petition
praying that the order of the Commis-
sion be modified or set aside, in whole
or in part. The Commission is required,
upon service of such a petition, to file in
the court a transcript of the complete
record upon which the order complained
of was entered, and upon the filing of
such transcript the court is given exclu-
sive jurisdiction to affirm, modify, and
enforce or set aside, such order, in whole
or in part. Each Act also contains the
usual provision that the judgment and
decree of the court is subject to review
by the United States Supreme Court up-
on certiorari or certification. Candor
compels me to admit, however, that the
remedy of judicial review, in most cases,
has no practical content. Business trans-
actions cannot wait upon the exigencies
of appeal. The overwhelming mass of
administrative determinations are never
reviewed by the courts. Time is of the
essence. Even appellate procedure with-
in the administrative by no means insures
that the unfortunate results of action un-
wise or arbitrary will be cured. The
remedy of appeal is not adequate.
The recognition of this fact has un-
doubtedly given impetus to the attack on
the so-called "Judge-Prosecutor" combi-
nation. No man, we are told, should be
a judge in his own case; one agency
should handle prosecution, another should
adjudicate. Lewis Carroll's cunning Old
Fury is quoted with abandon, and, view-
ing him with alarm, serious minded but,
I believe, misguided citizens enter on a
campaign for separation of functions.
Much has been said and written on
this subject-separation of functions-
which seems to me to disregard the reali-
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ties of administratikve practice and proce-
dure. Certainly it is wise that an admin-
istrative agency should conduct its for-
meal proceedings according to the rules of
fair play which have been developed over
centuries by the conscience of the bench,
the bar, and the man in the street. Nnd
I cannot reasonably quarrel with the be-
lief that rules and standards of conduct
in administrative hearings may appropri-
ately be codified even in statute, if not
for the control of the administrator at
least for the reassurance of the public.
But let us not be deceived as to the im-
portance of rules and standards in the
conduct of formal administrative hear-
ings. Whether the Securities and Ex-
change Commission on final considera-
tion will actually decide to enter a stop
order is interesting, but not very impor-
tant; for only a rare investor would pur-
chase securities from an issuer threaten-
ed with the administrative bar. When
the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion actually delists a security, the news
is important; but the market drops when
the order for hearing is announced.
When a court actually issues an injunc-
tion against a continued violation of the
Public Utility Holding Company Act, the
news will be found in the back pages of
the financial columns; the filing of a bill
for injunction, however, is front page
news. If nine out of ten Commission or-
ders never reach the courts for review,
ninety-nine out of a hundred business
problems presented to the Commission
for solution never reach the stage of for-
mal proceedings even before the Com-
mission. If the Commission were strip-
ped of every vestige of judicial power,
the problem of administrative fair play
would remain substantially undiminished.
Furthermore, separation of functions
would necessarily mean impairment of
functions. Rule-making and enforce-
ment cannot be separated from interpre-
tation and adjudication without sacrifice
of efficiency and of the public interest
sought to be protected or advanced. Co-
ordination is imperative. I venture to
assert dogmatically that the regulatory
function of any board or commission
would suffer irretrievably if enforcement
and policy-making were completely di-
vorced. If a rule is simple in its form,
and easily understandaile in its applica-
tion, its enforcement may be left to the
courts by prohibition and punishment.
But business and industry are no longer
simple, and the rules required for their
control are exceedingly complicated; they
are no longer rules, indeed, but codes of
regulation, as ramified as the business
they regulate. Administration, therefore,
no longer entails mere prohibition, but
the sympathetic understanding of compli-
cated business facts, uniformity of ap-
proach, and a constant time-consuming
supervisory interest. These are the mini-
mum demands of business itself. And
successful administration in the narrow
fields of social and economic enterprise
entrusted to the administrative agencies
requires in addition sensitive awareness
of the legislative intent, a keen recogni-
tion of the sources of abuse and evasion
against which the legislation was aimed,
and a constant zeal for justice and the
public welfare. To require that the rules
and regulations under the Securities Ex-
change Act regarding the solicitation of
proxies should be drafted by one agency
and interpreted by another is to deprive
those who are subject to regulation of
the thought, the experience, and the un-
derstanding of those who know the most
about the rules-the draftsmen. If we
concede, as I think we must, that the im-
plementation of statutes by rules requires
the aid of experts, it seems to me clear
beyond question that those same experts
are alone qualified to implement the pol-
icy expressed in the rules. Conflict,
waste, and inefficiency must attend any
separation of powers. While the current
attack on the blending of functions un-
doubtedly stems in part from those who
are sincerely concerned with the perfec-
tion of the administrative process as an
instrument of public welfare, care must
be taken to discount the fulminations of
those whose real motive springs from an-
tagonism to all public regulation. To
them it is easy to answer that they come
too late; but we must not let them be-
cloud the issue.
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And finally what I have said must
surely indicate that within the adminis-
trative there are already available numer-
ous and adequate protective devices
against the possible abuses of combined
powers. So far at least as our Commis-
sion is concerned, trial examiners are
wholly independent of the trial attorneys
and are subject directly to the Commis-
sion. Trial attorneys have no contact
with the Commission in contested cases,
and in no way are permitted to shape the
final decision otherwise than by evidence
included in the record. The Opinion
Section in the General Counsel's office is
entirely separate from both the staff of
trial examiners and the trial attorneys.
Trial examiners, it is true, are paid from
the Commission's budget; but so are the
budgeting and general servicing of the
Federal judiciary handled by the Depart-
ment of Justice. So far as I know, no
one has yet intimated that this control
has resulted in domination of the courts
by the executive. The trial examiner
and the trial attorney are both appointed
by the same group of men-the Commis-
sioners; but does this make their inde-
pendence and integrity more subject to
question than those of the District At-
torney and judge elected to office simul-
taneously on the same political party
platform? On behalf of the trial exam-
iners I resent the suggestion that they
are less honest than other judges.
In the second place, every order of the
Commission must be supported by ap-
propriate findings of fact, and reasons
for every determination must be formu-
lated in a Commission opinion. Arbi-
trary action, or even patently erroneous
action, is not likely to overcome the pow-
er of the balance wheel of enforced pub-
licity.
Thirdly, it should not be forgotten that
no governmental agency can long exist
if its basic policy, as expressed in both
enforcement and adjudication, operates
in a manner contrary to the public in-
terest. Businessmen are by no means
an inarticulate group; unfair or unrea-
sonable practice is not likely to continue
long.
And lastly, it is of the greatest sig-
nificance that most of the newer admin-
istrative agencies today are independent
tribunals, almost completely free from
interference by members of the execu-
tive and legislative departments. The
tradition of independence, we may at
least hope, will develop rather than de-
teriorate with the passage of time. And
with the tradition of independence there
is developing in the government today
what Veblen has called the "instinct of
workmanship"-an attitude that, more
than rules or functional safeguards, af-
fords assurance of informed and bal-
anced judgments. The "ultimate protec-
tion," as Professor Frankfurter has
pointed out, "is to be found in ourselves,
our zeal for liberty, our respect for one
another and for the common good".
Frankfurter, The Public and its Gov-
ernment, page 159.
ELMER A. SMITH
GeneraZ Attorney for Illinois Central Railroad
President Arant, Ladies and Gentle-
men: It is an old saying that happy
is the country that has no history. The
Interstate Commerce Commission has
been fortunate in that it has so conduct-
ed the hearings before it during its fifty-
one years of life that the Supreme Court
in only two or three cases has had oc-
casion to find that the Commission's
procedure resulted in a denial of pro-
cedural due process.
It is not too much to say that the kind
of hearing the Commission has sought
to give during these fifty-one years re-
flects the kind of hearing that the Com-
mission's first chairman, Judge Cooley of
Michigan, thought it ought to give. Per-
haps after all Judge Cooley's claim to
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enduring fame lies in the fact that he
as the Commission's first chairman laid
the foundations of the Commission's
work and thus really contributed to the
growth of American administrative law.
The Commission's approach to pro-
cedural due process has doubtless reflect-
ed the fact that the Commission in al-
most all its cases acts as a judge between
private interests. This is a character-
istic of the cases before the Commission
that should not be overlooked. In almost
all cases the Commission has on one
side the railroads and on the other the
shippers or localities or commercial as-
sociations. In most cases the parties are
represented by lawyers. Thus we have
not had the questions now before us
arising out of the fact that in many in-
stances the staff of an administrative
tribunal investigates, prosecutes, briefs
and argues before the tribunal itself.
It may be that it was the adversary
nature of the cases before the Commis-
sion that gave rise to the expression of
the Supreme Court (Inter. Com. Comm.
v. C. R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 218 U.S. 88,
30 S.Ct. 651, 54 L.Ed. 946) that from
whatever standpoint the powers of the
Commission may be viewed, they touch
many interests and have great conse-
quences, and they are expected to be ex-
ercised in the coldest neutrality.
But surely what is here said has equal
application to any administrative tribunal
that passes upon disputed questions, even
though such questions be new and novel
ones in the realm of the law.
There isn't any doubt that the Com-
mission's reputation today is due in large
measure to the manner in which it con-
ducts its hearings. The rules of plead-
ing are of the simplest. The Commis-
sion said in its first annual report, and
undoubtedly Judge Cooley wrote it, that
it was the Commission's desire that prac-
tice and proceedings before it should be
in the simplest form possible consistent
with justice. Questions respecting evi-
dence infrequently arise. The Commis-
sion has pointed out that it could not
conduct its proceedings if the hearsay
rule were strictly followed. My experi-
ence is that the Commission in matters
of evidence undertakes fairly to con-
sider whether the evidence, to use the
language of the Supreme Court in the
Consolidated Edison Company case, has
a rational probative force. The Su-
preme Court has said that if any party
believes that hearsay evidence is really
objectionable, proper objection should be
made. Spiller v. A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co.,
253 U.S. 117, 40 S.Ct. 466, 64 L.Ed.
810.
It would seem that possibly the Com-
mission is justified in relaxing the hear-
say rule to a greater extent than those
tribunals which do not deal to the extent
that the Commission does with statistics
and figures taken from reports and rec-
ords. For example, it might well be that
in a case involving a labor dispute, where
personal animosities and prejudices are
more likely to arise, the hearsay rule
could not in fairness to the parties be
relaxed to the extent that it is before the
Commission.
An example of such a situation is
found in the recent decision of the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in National Labor
Relations Board v. Union Pacific Stages,
9 Cir., 99 F.2d 153. See also the deci-
sion of Associate Justice Stephens in
Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. F. C. C.,
United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, 68 App.D.C. 292,
96 F.2d 564.
And then we have the human factor.
In the Commission's long life it has built
up a personnel that for the most part is
efficient and expert. The examiners of
course differ in their capacities, their
balance, and their judgment, yet on the
whole, the personnel of the Commission
and its staff and its reputation for fair-
ness and thoroughness justify the views
that have recently been expressed, if I
may quote Dean Landis in his recent
book on "The Administrative Process,"
that such a reputation attaching to a par-
ticular agency seeps through to the
judges and affects them in their treat-
ment of its decisions. See also Making
Administrative Action Safe, by Profes-
sor J. D. Masters, Amer. Bar Ass'n
Journal, October, 1938, page 837.
I have appeared and tried a gi eat
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many cases before the Commission and
have followed many of them into the
courts. I do not know of any case in
which I thought that there had been a
denial of a fair hearing. The fact of
the matter is that the Supreme Court
has reversed the Commission only twice
because of a lack of procedural due
process. You are all familiar with the
Orient Division case, [U. S. v. Abilene
& So. Ry. Co.], 265 U.S. 274, 44 S.Ct.
565, 68 L.Ed. 1016, in which the court
set aside an order of the Commission be-
cause it rested in part upon data taken
from the annual reports filed with the
Commission but which were not formally
put in evidence and to which attention
was not otherwise specifically called.
In the Western Grain case, [Atchison,
T. & S. F. R. Co. v. U. S.], 284 U.S.
248, 52 S.Ct. 146, 76 L.Ed. 273, the court
found that the Commission had denied
to the railroads procedural due process
in refusing to grant them a rehearing in
a very important case, the record in
which had been closed for some con-
siderable time before the Commission
had entered its decision.
It is true that there are a great many
cases in which there are dicta regarding
the requisites of a full hearing before
the Commission. I refer to only two of
them: the Baird case [Interstate Com-
merce Comm. v. Baird], 194 U.S. 25, 24
S.Ct. 563, 48 L.Ed. 860, which pointed
out that the Commission should not be
too narrowly constrained by technical
rules as to the admissibility of proof,
and the Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co.
case, [Interstate Commerce Comm. v.
Louisville & N. R. Co.], 227 U.S. 88, 33
S.Ct. 185, 57 L.Ed. 431, the language
in which has almost become a classic,
to the effect that the parties must be fully
apprised of the evidence submitted and
must be given an opportunity to cross-
examine witnesses, and offer evidence in
explanation or rebuttal.
Not infrequently the hearings are too
long, but I think that this is one of the
reasons why the Commission stands well
in the eyes of those who are most fa-
miliar with its work. The questions pre-
sented are sometimes extremely compli-
cated, involving a thousand 'and one
competing interests. The stock example
is the Grain case in which the record
stretched to well over 100,000 pages.
The Supreme Court itself has said that
the prospect that a hearing may be a long
one is no justification for its denial if
justice requires it. Western Grain case,
284 U.S. 248, page 262, 52 S.Ct. 146,
150, 76 L.Ed. 273. See also Ohio Bell
Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Com-
mission, 301 U.S. 292, 57 S.Ct. 724, 81
L.Ed. 1093.
But the result is that no interested par-
ties leave the hearings feeling that they
did not have an opportunity of explain-
ing their own interests, and they may
have been selfish interests, to the Com-
mission.
Mr. Commissioner Eastman recently
gave expression to a reasonable approach
to these questions. He said that we can
do a good deal to shorten and simplify
procedure, but that we cannot avoid it,
that on the whole, notwithstanding this
vexation, he believed it is well that this
is so, that in the long run it is the only
sure protection against arbitrary, or un-
principled, or unjust action, and that if a
tribunal has to tell why it does things
and can point to a record which sup-
ports its action, it cannot go far wrong
and survive.
The Supreme Court has just pointed
out (Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S.
1, page 20, 58 S.Ct. 773, 777, 999, 82
L.Ed. 1129) that the requirements of
fairness are not exhausted in the taking
or consideration of evidence but extend
to the concluding parts of the procedure
as well as to the beginning and inter-
mediate steps. This brings up the form
and the fairness in which the written re-
ports of the Commission are cast. A
casual examination of the Commission's
decisions will show the patience, time,
and care that have been put upon them
by the Commission's staff and by the
Commission itself. It is true that in
some cases the Supreme Court has ad-
monished the Commission as it has the
lower courts that complete statements
showing the grounds upon which the de-
terminations rest are necessary. You
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will recall that in two cases the orders of
the Commission were set aside because
of a lack of esseritial findings. Florida v.
United States, 282 U.S. 194, 51 S.Ct.
119, 75 L.Ed. 291, intra-state rates on
logs, and United States v. Baltimore &
0. R. Co., 293 U.S. 454, 55 S.Ct. 268,
79 L.Ed. 587, power reverse gears on
engines. But generally speaking the de-
cisions of the Commission show the
grounds upon which their determinations
rest.
In one case (Baltimore & 0. R. R. Co.
v. United States, D.C., 5 F.Supp. 929)
a three-judge court in a unanimous deci-
sion set aside the Commission's order
requiring power reverse gears on en-
gines because of the failure of the Com-
mission, as shown by its report, to con-
sider fairly all the pertinent testimony-
not to pick out some of the facts, but to
weigh fairly and conscientiously all of
them. The decision was sustained on a
somewhat narrower ground in the Su-
preme Court (293 U.S. 454, 55 S.Ct.
268, 79 L.Ed. 587)-on the ground that
the findings were not sufficient. I
thought of this decision when I read a
very recent decision of the Circuit Court
of Appeals in a Labor Board case. Na-
tional Labor Relations Board v. Union
Pacific Stages, 9 Cir., 99 F.2d 153. Here
an order was set aside because of the
Board's failure to consider all the evi-
dence. The Court said it did not con-
strue the language in the Act providing
that the findings of the Board as to facts
if supported by evidence shall be con-
clusive, as compelling the acceptance of
findings arrived at by accepting part of
the evidence and totally disregarding oth-
er convincing evidence.
I realize how difficult it is for a person
who is not familiar with all the facts al-
ways to draw the right conclusions from
a reported case, but I do feel that these
two decisions themselves bring out one
of the problems that must be faced fair-
ly and squarely by any administrative
tribunal. There must not only be a
fair hearing before the tribunal but
there must be a fair, impartial, and com-
plete consideration of all the evidence.
This does not mean, as the Supreme
Court has pointed out, that the Board
must recite all the evidence.
The Commission is also to be com-
mended I think for developing a tech-
nique in its procedure that has met with
the approval of parties who appear be-
fore the Commission. The procedure
that the Commission has worked out in
this respect has received implied ap-
proval of the Supreme Court in recent
cases. Morgan v. United States, 304
U.S. 1, 58 S.Ct. 773, 999, 82 L.Ed. 1129;
National Labor Board v. Mackay R. &
Teleg. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 58 S.Ct. 904,
82 L.Ed. 1381. As you all know, very
few cases before the Commission are
heard by the commissioners themselves;
they are heard by examiners who make
tentative reports. The parties may ex-
cept to these reports and replies to excep-
tions may be filed. When the case comes
to the Commission, therefore, the issues
are narrowed and the arguments directed
to specific findings and conclusions in the
proposed reports.
There is a rather novel procedure now
under the Motor Carriers Act, under
which these proposed reports become
final if no exceptions are filed by the
parties, and that the Commission itself
does not state it.
Chief Justice Hughes in the first de-
cision in the Morgan case, 298 U.S. 468,
56 S.Ct. 906, 80 L.Ed. 1288, said that
the one who decides shall be bound in
good conscience to consider the evidence,
to be guided by that alone, and to reach
his conclusion uninfluenced by extrane-
ous considerations which in other fields
might have play in determining purely
executive action-"does not preclude
practicable administrative procedure in
obtaining the aid of assistants in the de-
partment. Assistants may prosecute in-
quiries. Evidence may be taken by an
examiner. Evidence thus taken may be
sifted and analyzed by competent sub-
ordinates. Argument may be oral or
written. The requirements are not tech-
nical. But there must be a hearing in a
substantial sense. And to give the sub-
stance of a hearing, which is for the pur-
pose of making determinations upon evi-
dence, the officer who makes the deter-
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minations must consider and appraise the
evidence which justifies them. That duty
undoubtedly may be an onerous one, but
the performance of it in a substantial
manner is inseparable from the exercise
of the important authority conferred."
Pages 480, 481, 482, 56 S.Ct. page 911.
It is a fair statement that the Inter-
state Commerce Commission follows .the
principles herein announced. A world of
detail work is done by its staff, but in
the end we have the mind of the Commis-
sion on the issues presented.
There are cases in which the Commis-
sion's staff investigates the facts under
the direction of a bureau of the Com-
mission, presents the evidence, and ar-
gues the cases before the Commission. I
believe it is a fair statement that in these
cases the Commission consciously or un-
consciously is inclined to give very great
weight to the arguments of its own staff.
I do not ask you to take my word for
this, but I call your attention to the re-
cent decision in Freight Forwarding In-
vestigation, 229 I.C.C. 201, a decision
that very largely reflects the work of
the Commission's staff in developing the
facts. Mr. Commissioner Eastman's dis-
senting opinion shows to my mind some
of the fallacies urged upon the Commis-
sion by its own staff and adopted by the
Commission. I should state, however,
that there appeared in this particular pro-
ceeding counsel for the railroad com-
panies, for the forwarders, and for the
shippers.
Perhaps one way out may be the plan
announced just a few day ago by the
Civil Aeronautical Authority in which
the Authority undertakes to achieve a
separation of the functions of prosecutor
and judge. It has set up an Economic
Compliance Division which will have the
duty of acting as advocate or prose-
cutor in behalf of the public interest in
all cases before the Authority. While
the Division will necessarily be responsi-
ble to the five-man Authority, the Au-
thority will not undertake to interfere
with or control the action of the Division
but will leave it free to make its own
contentions on behalf of the public in-
terest.
I have been much interested in what
has heretofore been said because it ap-
pears that a similar plan of organization
has already been put into effect in the
other administrative tribunals.
It seems to me, however, that there
ought to be a further condition and that
is that if the Division of the tribunal is
free to make its own contentions on be-
half of the public interest, the tribunal
itself should be freed from any contact
with its investigating and prosecuting
arm in the consideration that the tribu-
nal itself gives to the case, in the con-
clusions which it reaches, and the report
which it writes.
This plan carries out the thought that
Mr. Commissioner Aitchison of the In-
terstate Commerce Commission ex-
pressed in a recent address on "Reform-
ing the Administrative Process" (ad-
dress delivered at the annual convention
of the Association of Practitioners Be-
fore the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, held in Pittsburgh, October 6, 1938,
-October, 1938 issue of I. C. C. Prac-
titioners' Journal, page 25). He con-
sidered the tendencies in administrative
action which are the subject of cur-
rent-day criticism, including the con-
fusion in rate-making, investigation,
prosecution, and the functions of the
judges, and said that every one of the
tendencies cited was within the power of
the offending agency to avoid, without
additional legislation. And he made this
significant statement (page 30): "And
the prophecy may be ventured that, with
the aid of existing powers of judicial
review, public opinion and the pride of
every administrative agency in having
its determinations sustained will suffice
to bring about any needed correction."
This has been touched upon by the
preceding speaker but I am giving you
my views from the standpoint of a per-
son who is construing an administrative
act. A great many questions that arise
under the act are never passed on by the
Commission in its decided reports.
Here let me say that entirely too much
time has been 'devoted by students of the
law to judicial review of administra-
tive decisions and not half enough time
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to the very problems we are considering
here today and which in the end are of
more practical importance. So far as
the Commission is concerned, out of the
hundreds of cases that it decides every
year a bare handful are taken to the
courts. We as lawyers ought to devote
more time to what an administrative
tribunal does and how it does it. That
the tide has turned is I think shown by
Professor Sharfman's epochal work on
the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Mr. Felix Frankfurter has recently
quoted a sentence from Judge Learned
Hand that after all the requirement of
due process is merely the embodiment of
the English sporting idea of fair play.
(Mr. Justice Holmes, by Felix Frank-
furter). The Chief Justice in the last
decision in Morgan v. United States, 304
U.S. 1, 58 S.Ct. 773, 999, 82 L.Ed. 1129,
used this same phrase: "the liberty and
property of the citizen shall be protected
by the rudimentary requirements of fair
play" (pages 14, 15, 58 S.Ct. page 775).
It does not seem to me that it would
be a difficult matter for any administra-
tive tribunal to determine whether under
the facts in any case there has been this
rudimentary requirement of fair play. I
think that any lawyer before an admin-
istrative tribunal at the conclusion of the
case, if he considers the problem as dis-
passionately as he can, can himself de-
termine whether there has been pro-
cedural due process, and whether the
whole approach of the Commission to the
problem before it and the decision itself
reflect the elements of fair play.
Of course in the last analysis it is the
force of public opinion that will deter-
mine the usefulness and life of adminis-
trative tribunals. I think they have all
got to justify themselves, as I deeply
feel the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion has justified itself, in the eyes of
those who appear before them and who
come in actual contact with their work
and in the eyes of the public at large.
Here again I do not ask you to take my
opinion but the opinion of the shippers
of the country who have risen to the
defense of the Commission on several
recent occasions, the last one when a
committee appointed by the President
suggested that the Commission be dis-
membered and many of its functions di-
vided among the executive departments.
There is a winning and a losing side of
course in every case that the Commis-
sion decides, but from the shippers'
standpoint the Commission stands as a
check on the power that the railroads
would otherwise possess.
It is clear that under present-day con-
ditions administrative tribunals are nec-
essary instruments of a democracy and
that unless these economic conflicts in
a complicated social structure can be
solved by some rule of law, there may
be no alternative except recourse to arbi-
trary power. An administrative body
can make itself a real servant of a demo-
cratic way of life.
It was said of Judge Cooley that he
had made the Commission what its cre-
ators never contemplated-a tribunal of
justice in a field and for a class of ques-
tions where all was chaos before. There
isn't any doubt in my mind that this
can be done for other classes of ques-
tions involving economic disputes and
social relationships if the administrative
tribunals can bring to themselves the
confidence of those who appear before
them and the public at large.
Perhaps it may not be out of place
to refer to some views that have re-
cently been expressed on this subject.
Mr. Alvin Johnson, Professor of Eco-
nomics at Yale University, in the cur-
rent number of The Yale Review, after
paying a compliment to the administra-
tion of the Labor Board Act goes on to
say however that the Act itself presents
a color of partiality through failing to
set apart the function of investigation
and of prosecution from the function of
deciding cases at issue, that we have the
scandal of witnessing an even boxing
match between a government organ and
a big industry.
Professor Gardner of the Harvard
Law School in a recent review of "The
Administrative Process" by Dean Lan-
dis, suggests that in some of the things
there said we have a re-assertion of the
antique conception of royal power. That
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this conception of royal power has been
advocated on behalf of the commissions
is shown by the decisions of the courts.
It is only necessary to refer to two of
them. In the well-known Louisville &
Nashville R. R. Co. case, [Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Louisville &
N. R. Co.], 227 U.S. 88, 33 S.Ct. 185,
57 L.Ed. 431, it was argued on behalf of
the government that where the Inter-
state Commerce Commission expresses
the opinion that a rate is unreasonable,
an order based on such an opinion is
conclusive and can not be set aside even
if the finding is wholly without substan-
tial evidence to support it. I think this
shows how far the zeal of the govern-
ment to win a case will carry it. The
Supreme Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Lamar, refused to endow the
Commission with any such royal power.
But substantially the same contention
was more recently made by the Federal
Communications Commission when it
urged that all it had to do to give bind-
ing effect to its order was to make the
stark finding one way or the other that
public convenience and necessity would
be served. The Court said that no com-
mission exercising the judicial function
ought to render a decision without know-
ing the grounds therefor, and that a
statement of these grounds must neces-
sarily be drawn from the facts found.
The order of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission was upheld, but the
case is significant as indicating the argu-
ment advanced on behalf of the Com-
munications Commission. Missouri
Broadcasting Corp. v. F. C. C., United
States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia,' 68 App.D.C. 154, 94 F.2d
623. See also Saginaw Co. v. F. C. C.,
68 App.D.C. 282, 96 F.2d 554, 555.
Perhaps these newer administrative
tribunals could have learned much had
they given some time and thought to pro-
cedure before the Interstate Commerce
Commission, its own decisions touching
that procedure, and the decisions of the
courts reviewing orders of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission. I could
never understand, for example, upon
what theory the National Bituminous
Coal Commission assumed that it could
fix coal prices without giving the man
who produced the coal or the consumer
who paid for it a hearing.
What Messrs. Johnson and Gardner
have said may well be taken to be straws
in the wind, and to suggest to adminis-
trative tribunals from the oldest to the
youngest that they can establish them-
selves in the Nation's confidence only
by following the Anglo-Saxon tradition
of fair play.
RALPH HORWEEN
Formerly associated with the Petroleum Administration
President Arant, Ladies and Gentle-
men: I warned Dean Arant that the
subject I was to speak on was not di-
rectly in point to the very important
questions which you have been discussing
here today. Nevertheless he suggested
that you might be interested in, if not
entertained by a recital of a few of the
episodes which occurred during the
building up of the first federal admin-
istrative agency in connection with the
oil industry which is functioning today.
Most of the administrative work in
the oil industry is done by the state ad-
ministrative bodies in the oil producing
states, but not all the oil producing states
have administrative bodies, and that is
the trouble.
One of the reasons I think you may
be interested in this subject matter is
that, perhaps, sooner or later, if the
problem is ever attacked in a compre-
hensive way, and settled on a national
basis, it can only be done by a federal ad-
ministrative body with ample powers
under a statute.
In tracing this bit of dramatic his-
tory, however, I do not think you will
get the most out of it without a little
background of the oil industry and the
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complexities of the problems which
arose.
Oil is irreplaceable. Our present
known reserves, recoverable at approxi-
mate present day costs, would last us for
twelve to fifteen years, at the current
rate of production,-about one billion
barrels per year. We have, roughly, 25
per cent to 30 per cent of the world's
known reserves, and produce 62 per cent
of all the oil produced in the world.
There are a few inexorable laws gov-
erning the accumulation and production
of oil. Crude oil is found in sedimentary
rocks of very ancient geologic basins.
It is always associated with salt water.
The sedimentary deposits on the floor of
these basins are arranged in alternate
layers consisting of porous sandstones
or limestones (called reservoir rocks or
oil sands) and impervious shales (called
cap rocks). Oil accumulates where fold-
ings or other non-conformities create a
dome or other form of trap, but it did not
originate there. Oil and gas probably
originated in old seabeds, and after gen-
erating high pressures, migrated through
the porous rocks or sands until the whole
mixture was trapped in an anticline, or
dome, or fault structure under the im-
pervious cap rock. Sometimes there is
a free gas cap. The greater the pressure
in the reservoir the greater the amount
of gas which is held in solution in the
oil. The oil is not in a lake or a river,
but occupies the spaces in the porous
sands, in association with gas. These
accumulations are known to occur from
a few hundred feet to almost three miles
below the surface. How much deeper
they are no one knows.
Of course, actual geological conditions
are very complex with complicated fold-
ings, faults and other non-conformities.
The productive sands vary in thickness;
there may be several producing sands in
the same structure. Porosity and the
oil bearing capacity of the sands vary
tremendously. Individual pools range in
size from very small ones to the gigantic
East Texas field which has an area of
some 130,000 producing acres, and an
estimated oil content of six billion bar-
rels, of which more than one billion has
already been extracted.
The gas, oil and water in the reser-
voir are confined under pressure in a
state of equilibrium; the natural pres-
sure in the reservoir, or what is known
as reservoir energy, is stored in the solu-
tion of gas in the oil, in the free gas un-
der pressure, and in the water pressing
against the oil on the flanks of the struc-
ture.
The production of oil is dependent
upon the simple principle of creating a
point of lowered pressure in the reser-
voir. When the well penetrates the cap
rock, the pressure equilibrium is dis-
turbed. The reservoir becomes in reality
a gas and hydraulic engine forcing the
liquids and gases to move through the
pores of the sands to the point of low-
ered pressure at the well bore. The
lowered pressure permits gas in the oil
to expand and comes out of solution,
just exactly as the gas escapes from
charged soda water when you release
the pressure by taking the cap off the
bottle. This expansion of the gas in solu-
tion, together with the expansive force of
the free gas and the pressure of the wa-
ter against the flanks, drives the oil
through the rocks to the well and up to
the surface. The gas which is held in
the oil by the pressures is the prime mo-
tive force for the extraction of oil from
the reservoir.
In flush fields, where the natural pres-"
sure in the reservoir is high enough,
the mere opening of the well valve is
sufficient to cause migration to the well
and to lift the oil to the surface. These
are the gushers. When the pressure has
been depleted, the lifting of. oil to the
surface by pumps creates the necessary
pressure differential to cause the migra-
tion of free oil to the bottom of the
well.
Besides furnishing motive power, the
gas in solution in the oil performs an7
other vital function. It makes the oil
lighter, less viscous and more fluid, so
that it can permeate through the pores of
the sands to the well.
As the pressure in the reservoir de-
clines, more dissolved gas comes out of
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the oil, leaving it thicker and increasing-
ly difficult to move. When pressures de-
cline to a certain point, there will be so
little gas left in solution that the oil
clings to the sands and can never be re-
covered, except by very expensive meth-
ods.
The total reservoir energy and the
total volume of oil and gas confined in
any oil pool are definitely limited. The
location of the reservoir has no relation-
ship whatsoever to the lines of prop-
erty ownership on the surface. How-
ever, the drainage of oil and gas and
the depletion of the reservoir energy
through wells drilled into the common
reservoir directly control the total
amount of oil which can be recovered,
and determine the total amount of reser-
voir energy which can be used to pro-
duce oil from the reservoir.
Oil in a pool is never exhausted. The
gas energy is exhausted and the reser-
voir is abandoned.
The amount of ultimate recovery from
any oil pool depends primarily upon
the use and maintenance of reservoir gas
pressures, not only to furnish the energy
necessary to raise the oil, but also to
keep the oil in a sufficiently fluid con-
dition to get it out of the sands at all.
Wide open flow, or too rapid flow, has
this effect: Excessive amounts of gas
are released, which quickly depletes the
reservoir pressure; dissolved gas leaves
the o; the oil then becomes thicker and
tends to remain where it lies in the for-
mation; oil moves out through the well
faster than it can be replaced by oil fur-
ther away from the well, and salt water
(more fluid than oil), rushes into this
low pressure area, drowning the well and
blocking 6ff other oil from reaching it.
This is known as "channelling" or "con-
ing."
The important legal factors are the
leasing system and the "law of capture."
Because of the hazardous and specula-
tive character of finding and producing
oil, the operator does not usually own the
fee, but acquires the land under a lease
by which he gets only the right to ex-
plore, drill and produce oil, in considera-
tion of his agreement to pay the lessor a
royalty when, as and if oil is produced.
Rarely is the surface over an oil pool
held by one or even a few owners or les-
sees. Even though one interest may hold
a large part of the surface under lease,
his acreage is usually checkerboarded
over the pool. The ownership of the
royalty interest is almost invariably held
by a large number of individuals.
Very early in the game the courts held
that, since the real consideration for the
lessor having leased his property was
the royalty to be paid out of the produc-
tion of oil, the lessor (or the royalty own-
er if the lessor had transferred his roy-
alty interest) could compel the lessee to
drill and produce at least as rapidly as
other producers in the same pool, in or-
der to protect the leased land from drain-
age. The penalty was forfeiture for
failure to live up to the implied covenants
of diligent operation.
The second legal factor is the so-called
"law of capture." It is briefly this: A
producer may drill as many wells as he
pleases and may take and keep all the
oil and gas which he can produce from
his wells, regardless of whether he
wastefully blows gas into the air, drains
oil and gas from another man's property
or uses more than his share of the reser-
voir energy in the entire pool; the only
recourse of other surface owners in the
same pool to protect their properties
against drainage and destruction of res-
ervoir energy is to drill offset wells and
produce in like manner, in the hope of
setting up counteracting drainage. The
cost of drilling such superfluous wells,
the waste of oil and gas, the plundering
of reservoir energy, and the consequent
destruction of the correlative property
rights of all the co-owners in the common
pool are completely ignored by this prim-
itive dogma "go thou and do likewise."
This principle was first laid down by
the courts of Pennsylvania in the early
days. Although there was ample com-
mon law precedent for a rule of law
which would protect the correlative
rights of land owners (analogous to the
principle of shoring up), so little was
known of the nature of oil and gas in
those days that the courts conjured up a
Symposium on Administrative Law
picture of a running stream below the
ground, and followed the common law
analogy of percolating waters and wild
animals.
Although adopted in deep ignorance of
the physical laws and enginering prin-
ciples applicable to oil and gas, the law
of capture became so firmly established
by constant judicial repetition that the
courts speak of it as a "vested property
right." Unbelievable as it may seem,
this shibboleth has been held responsible
for the colossal waste and for the peri-
odic demoralization in the oil industry.
The basis of the doctrine is supposed-
ly the impossibility of obtaining reason-
ably accurate knowledge of the sub-sur-
face movements of oil and gas. Never-
theless, when the lessor sued for dam-
ages or forfeiture, claiming breach of
implied covenants of diligence, the courts
have not hesitated to receive such evi-
dence as was available to show the
amount of drainage sustained by the
lessor because of the lessee's failure to
protect against drainage.
Now the economic factors: There is
a large initial investment in the drilling
of a well. The cost of operating a well
in a flush pool is negligible-merely the
opening of a valve. A low price for oil,
strange as it may seem, results in in-
creased production,-the producer striv-
ing for the same number of dollars to
meet his overhead costs, regardless of the
number of barrels of oil. Because of the
cumulative effect of the leasing system,
the law of capture and the physical fac-
tors, it is always to the greatest economic
advantage for an individual operator to
drill more wells and to produce his wells
at a faster rate than his neighbors who
also draw from the same common reser-
voir; because he can increase the total
amount of oil which he can drain from
the common pool at their expense; and
he can decrease his costs of production
per barrel by producing a greater volume
of oil under conditions of flush produc-
tion. He also gets an advantage over his
neighbors by using more than his just
share of the reservoir energy. The one
who flows his wells at the most rapid
rate sets the pace for the other owners
in the pool, because they must do likewise
in order to prevent drainage, loss of ul-
timate recovery and forfeiture. It is a
run on the bank, except that each depos-
itor, in addition to trying to get his own
money out, does his best to get the other
fellow's as well; all of them must sell
their oil as fast as it is produced, regard-
less of the demand or the price; no one
can reduce his production unless every
other producer in the same pool does
likewise. If some sensible producer
should want to produce more slowly, he
would not only have his oil drained away
by the others (and with no recourse),
but he would be in constant danger of
forfeiture by his lessor. Oil from newly
found flush fields of low production cost
was constantly offered at progressively
lower prices, and wiped out of the mar-
ket the wells of settled production until
these new flush fields literally "blew their
heads off," and went on the pump. The
resulting waste was almost incalculable,
not only in the flush fields, but because of
the premature abandonment of stripper
wells, and 40 per cent of our reserves are
under these stripper wells of settled pro-
duction. Wells were located, not with
reference to position on the structure,
not for purposes of efficient drainage,
but by the purely accidental location of
property lines. Wells bottomed in the
gas cap were blowing gas to high heaven
in the hope of getting some oil out, and
wells drilled in the oil belt were flowed
wide open in the mad race to drain the
other fellow. It is safe to say that in
many of our great fields which were de-
veloped in this way, only about 10 per
cent to 15 per cent of the oil content was
recovered. In the absence of legislative
protection, operators were compelled to
drill thousands of unnecessary offset
wells under threat of drainage and for-
feiture of their leases. Even today,
about $100,000,000 is the annual bill for
unnecessary offset wells. Based on our
annual production of one billion barrels,
this is a production tax of 10 per cent
for the privilege of worshipping the law
of capture. The consumer will pay it,
sooner or later.
Of course, the obvious answer is that
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the pool is the economic unit, and should
be operated as such, with a division of
the oil, after it is brought up, in propor-
tion to the oil in place under each hold-
ing. This has been done in this country
in a few fields by agreement, and is the
uniform practice in the big fields in the
Near East and elsewhere. Wells are
drilled for efficient drainage, and for no
other reason. The gas pressure is con-
served by proper rates of withdrawal;
the wells flow naturally for almost the
entire life of the field, and from two to
four times as much oil is recovered at
one-half to one-third of the cost.
This is the intelligent way of assuring
to each owner his just share, based on
modern engineering knowledge. Under
the law of capture, he can only try to get
his just share by drilling offset wells and
producing as fast as his neighbor,-at a
terrific cost, in the waste of natural re-
sources, and expense of utterly unneces-
sary wells.
New Mexico-Oklahoma
Of course the application of modern
engineering in repressuring or reflooding
operations in order to increase the
amount of ultimate recovery is impossi-
ble except in a unitized operation.
Oklahoma enacted the first compre-
hensive conservation statute in 1915, 52
Okl.St.Ann. § 271 et seq. This legisla-
tion prohibited waste in the production
of oil and empowered the Corporation
Commission to make the necessary or-
ders to prevent waste by the regulation of
production methods, by curtailing total
production to market demand, and com-
pelling ratable taking by owners in a com-
mon pool. The statute defined waste to
mean physical waste both below ground
and above ground, and also economic
waste arising from production in excess
of storage and transportation facilities
and in excess of market demand. Things
went along fairly smoothly until the orgy
of the Oklahoma City field in 1930, cou-
pled with the immense uncontrolled pro-
duction in the East Texas field in the
same year, broke the price of crude oil
to 25 cents or 30 cents a barrel. There
was an interlude of martial law in which
the governor shut down all the wells. In
the meantime the Champlin case [Cham-
plin Refining Co. v. Corp. Comm.], 286
U.S. 210, 52 S.Ct. 559, 76 L.Ed. 1062,
86 A.L.R. 403] reached the Supreme
Court of the United States and the pow-
er of the Corporation Commission was
upheld.
Texas had a similar law with the ex-
ception, however, that the statute, while
expressly authorizing the Railroad Com-
mission to curtail and prorate production,
contained the proviso that waste should
not be construed to mean economic
waste. The Commission employed its
powers very sparingly until there was a
sudden cry for conservation when the ex-
cess production of the East Texas field
cracked the price of crude oil to 10 cents
a barrel in 1930 and 1931.
The history of the proration of oil pro-
duction in Texas by the Railroad Com-
mission is a fascinating story in admin-
istrative law. It illustrates the tremen-
dous powers and influence of such ad-
ministrative body and presents an illu-
minating picture of the Commission's
conflict with the Federal courts and their
final reconciliation.
For two years the Federal courts
struck down order after order of the
Commission, without, however, holding
the statute to be invalid. No sooner was
one order enjoined than the Commission
held new hearings, recorded more testi-
mony, made new findings and new or-
ders. By the summer of 1931, produc-
tion in this great new field alone reached
one million barrels a day. Reservoir
pressures were dropping in the tradition-
al fashion; the freebooters flowed their
wells wide open to steal their neighbor's
oil, the law of capture reigned supreme,
and the legitimate producers were tempt-
ed to operate in the same way in self de-
fense, and crude oil was selling for 10
cents a barrel,-less than the price of
drinking water. The engineers testified
almost unanimously that withdrawals in
excess of 400,000 barrels a day would
plunder the field by reducing pressures
prematurely and permitting the irregular
intrusion of salt water, which in turn
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v',ould reduce the ultimate recovery from
the field by colossal amounts. In Au-
gust, 1931, immediately after the Federal
courts enjoined an order of the Commis-
sion, Governor Sterling declared martial
law and ordered the troops to shut in all
the wells in the field. The Federal courts
enjoined the Governor and his Adjutant
General. Pending appeal to the Supreme
Court, however, the Governor left the
troops in the field as peace officers, sub-
ject to the orders of the Commission, and
not as soldiers subject to the orders of
the Chief Executive. In December,
1932, the Supreme Court affirmed the in-
junction.
Under an amended statute, the Com-
mission finally made its first proration
order for the East Texas field that was
sustained by the Federal court in April,
1933.
During all this period, however, and
also after the date of the first valid or-
der, hot oil production in amounts esti-
mated up to 500,000 barrels per day was
coming out of the field. The national
price-structure for oil was based on East
Texas crude at 10 cents to 25 cents a bar-
rel. Quite apart from the waste in the
East Texas field itself, the economic cost
was still greater. Older fields either had
to lose their markets or open wide to
meet this kind of competition. Oklaho-
ma could not produce rationally if Texas
ran wild, and as a result, the Oklahoma
proration orders could not be enforced.
Curtailment, plus 10 cent oil, spelled
bankruptcy. The public got cheaper gas-
oline temporarily,-but the cost was yet
to be paid.
Then came the NRA legislation, with
Section 9 (c), 15 U.S.C.A. § 709 (c).
9(c) provided: The President is au-
thorized to prohibit the shipment in in-
terstate commerce of petroleum or its
products produced in violation of state
law, with penalties of fine and imprison-
ment for violation of the statute or regu-
lations issued thereunder. The Presi-
dent, by executive order, did so prohibit,
-and designated the Secretary of the In-
terior, as his agent. Regulations under
9(c) were made, and a force of Federal
investigators swarmed into the East Tex-
as field to get evidence to prosecute im-
mediately any violations.
As the first step in the conservation
program under the Code, the Bureau of
Mines set the production quota for each
state, and the Secretary put pressure on
the industry throughout the country to
raise th price of crude oil to $1.00 a bar-
rel. (To make possible compliance with
curtailment and sane practices.) This
was done. The next essential objective
was to raise the price of gasoline to a
level commensurate with this crude price,
as recommended in the Code: 181/2 to 1.
At $1.00 a barrel for crude, this was an
average price of 5.4 cents for all grades
of gasoline. Of course this was a bonan-
za for the hot oil operators in East Texas
because they were smart enough to sell
illegal oil at prices ranging from 30 cents
to 60 cents a barrel, whereas previously
they got only 10 cents a barrel for it.
Legal crude was $1.00 a barrel and legal
gasoline was bringing between 31/2 cents
and 4 cents while hot gasoline was bring-
ing around 2 cents. The enforcement of
9(c) was simply non-existent. The Fed-
eral sleuths in East Texas were soon re-
garded as such a joke that, by way of
rubbing it in, local papers .carried ad-
vertisements for the sale of false whis-
kers as disguises for Federal Dicks.
(The field allowable was 425,000 bar-
rels per day-the field's daily potential
perhaps 10,000,000. Hot production 400,-
000.)
The state of Texas had a very elabo-
rate tender system. A "tender" is an oil
country name for a shipping permit.
The producer who wanted to ship had to
get a permit from the Railroad Commis-
sion upon making a showing that his oil
was legally produced. The Railroad
Commission was apparently helpless as
to oil tendered for interstate shipment,
because of court rulings that it had no
jurisdiction to interfere with interstate
commerce. The field was so large, the
number of producers was so great, there
was so much money at stake-well, it
was common gossip that tenders on un-
pedigreed oil could be had at 20 cents a
barrel-if you had the proper legal rep-
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resentation. Most of the violators didn't
even bother to get tenders.
The Federal regulations required each
producer, each of the 85 refineries in the
field, each of the numerous gathering sys-
tems and interconnecting pipe line sys-
tems to file elaborate reports, and to
make records available for inspection.
They also provided that each bill-of-lad-
ing for interstate shipment must be ac-
companied by a sworn affidavit that the
products tendered were legally produced.
The form was designated as Form "0.
E.S." These were soon affectionately
known in the field as the "Oh Yeah" af-
fidavits. Thousands of them were sol-
emnly filed with the railroad signed
"Harold L. Ickes, Franklin D. Roose-
velt" and others, and showing the con-
signee as "George, the Fifth" and "John
D. Rockefeller" and so the game went
merrily on.
The field was dotted with hundreds of
huge open air storage pits, which were
merely earth embankments, holding sev-
eral hundred thousand barrels. (Best es-
timates were that some 20 million barrels
were stored right in the field in this
way.) These bottomless pits were al-
ways mysteriously full, no matter how
much oil was pumped out to the refin-
eries in the field, and a check-up by Fed-
eral agents was revealing that hot oil was
run into them by concealed underground
connections from hundreds of wells.
This, and the fact that the hot oil re-
finers kept no records, made it impossi-
ble to make proof against them without
an actual check of their operations. So
some of the boys went into the Federal
courts and got an injunction against the
Federal agents coming on their property,
on the grounds that 9(c) was unconsti-
tutional as beyond the commerce power.
This was the Panama Refining case
[Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan], 293 U.
S. 388, 55 S.Ct.,241, 79 L.Ed. 446. The
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, but
left the injunction in force pending cer-
tiorari to the Supreme Court.
Although thus stymied, the Federal
Government tried again to protect the le-
gitimate industry from the competition
of stolen oil. The allowable was 28 bar-
rels a day for each well; many hot wells
were running 10,000 barrels a day, and
the unequal intrusion of salt water was
drowning out big sections of the field.
The law-abiding producers were about to
open up their wells in self-defense unless
the theft of their oil was stopped-and
East Texas, the world's largest pool,
would have gone the way of so many
others.
To bolster up the price of gasoline and
as a desperate attempt to stop hot oil,
during the spring and summer of 1934
under the authorization of the Petroleum
Code there were a series of so-called
"buying programs" (the predecessors of
the alleged buying programs of the Mad-
ison indictments). Under express urg-
ing sanction and authority of the Admin-
istrator (which meant a command in
those days) a group of the larger com-
panies, by agreement, purchased so-called
"distress gasoline" from independent re-
finers who had been deprived of their
markets by the flood of bootleg gasoline
from East Texas. In the East Texas
field, too, the program was carried on by
purchases from all the refiners there who
would sign the approved form of con-
tract. Some, but not all, signed up.
These contracts were in effect a bribe and
provided that their gasoline would be
purchased at a fat price on condition that
they abide by the proration orders of the
Texas Railroad Commission, and made
the required reports. But the higher
price merely brought on increased hot
oil production by those who did not sign
up. It was like trying to bail out the
ocean, and after many thousands of cars
of gasoline were purchased over a period
of about nine months, the attempt was
abandoned.
Stymied again, the Federals, in Octo-
ber, 1934, tried a new scheme. Under
the authority of Section 9 (c) a new set
of regulations was issued which prohibit-
ed any interstate carrier from shipping
or accepting for interstate shipment any
crude or refined oil from the East Texas
field unless the shipment was accompa-
nied by a Federal shipping permit. These
were known as Federal tenders. The
regulations set up a so-called Federal
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Tender Board to hold hearings in the
East Texas field and to issue such Fed-
eral permits if the applicant demonstrat-
ed that the shipment was manufactured
out of legally produced oil.
This was administrative law de luxe.:
The statute did not provide for any
method of review; consequently the only
remedy available to persons who differed
with the Board or its authority was by
injunction in the Federal courts. Al-
though the Federals had been enjoined in
the Panama case from coming on the
properties of the plaintiffs, by this sim-
ple expedient the same plaintiffs were
compelled to come before the Board with
records and testimony to prove the legal
origin of their oil if it were to move out
of the state-and there was no market
available in Texas.
As one of the three members of this
administrative body, the scenes are still
vivid in my mind. We held forth in a
one-story shack, hastily nailed together,
in a thickly wooded part of this tremen-
dous field, close to the same building in
which the Texas Railroad Commission
had its local office and held its hearings
for state tenders. We soon learned a
few things about administrative law as
practiced in Texas. Anyone had a stand-
ing to be heard. Picture a room blue
with smoke, a rough table at one end,
and filled with a dense crowd of produc-
ers, drilling rough-necks, oil company
scouts, pirates, state investigators and a
general crowd of the oil fraternity. The
costumes were picturesque. Oil derricks
were in sight all over the place. In the
hearings for state tenders it was a com-
mon occurrence, when an application for
a tender was presented, for a dozen peo-
ple in the crowd to shout that the so-and-
so had been accused last year of running
hot oil or running out hot gasoline at
night and that therefore his present ap-
plication should be refused. Then the
free-for-all argument was on until the
local officer of the Texas Railroad Com-
mission would call a halt and make his
ruling.
A storm of injunction suits in the Ved-
eral courts hit us when it became clear,
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after the first few hearings, that we were
going to stand on two principles: First
that the Federal Board was not bound by
the finding of the state Board as to the
legality of the oil tendered, but would
rely on its own investigation as well.
(The hot oil group were pretty well iden-
tified.) The only penalty provided in
the Texas statute for violation of the
proration orders was a maximum fine of
$1,000 for each offense. Violators, hav-
ing paid a fine of $1,000 for having run
150,000 barrels of hot oil, applied for a
state tender for the shipment (either in
the form of crude or refined products),
solemnly taking the position that since
they had paid the fine there was nothing
more illegal about this oil. The state
courts actually compelled the Commis-
sion by mandamus, to issue tenders. The
Federal Board, however, was unable to
distinguish between hot oil and the same
oil anointed by the payment of $1,000
fine. Federal tenders were refused. Sec-
ondly, the Federal Board adopted the so-
called co-mingling theory. Due to the
millions of barrels of oil stored in open
pits with no pedigree (and everyone
knew they could not be emptied), it was
a simple matter for the hot oil refiners
to scramble up, in the figures of their re-
fining operations, a little legal oil with the
unpedigreed oil and to obtain state ten-
ders for shipments out of the co-mingled
mass. The Federal Board put the bur-
den on the applicant to segregate the le-
gal molecules from the hot molecules in
the co-mingled mass. Since no one was
able to solve this problem of chemical
geneology, the findings were: "Tender
refused."
Then came the decision of the Su-
preme Court in the Panama Refining case
on January 8, 1935. A month later Con-
gress passed the so-called Connolly Hot
Oil Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 715 et seq. A
Federal Tender Board still functions in
the East Texas field. The field allowable
has been held to about 425,000 barrels a
day ever since, and by the slow equalized
withdrawals, probably a billion barrels of
recoverable reserves have been saved
from destruction. Hot oil is no more.
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President Arant, Ladies and Gentle-
men: The question before us is, to what
extent is administrative action efficient,
and particularly to what extent does it
protect private personal and property
rights as demanded by constitutional pro-
visions and our general Anglo-American
concepts of justice.
It is natural for common law lawyers
to test the procedures of administrative
agencies by the extent to which they cor-
respond with the practices of the ordi-
nary courts of justice with which they
are familiar. Nevertheless a vital dif-
ference exists between the two types of
bodies. A court of justice is essentially
passive, acting only when its jurisdiction
is appealed to, undertaking on its own
part none of the burden of preparing and
presenting the cause, and rendering its
decision only on the case as presented to
it by the parties litigant. The function
of most administrative tribunals is much
more dynamic than this. They are not
mere substitutes for courts of law. The
administrative tribunals are invested by
legislative mandate with the positive duty
of executing and carrying into effect cer-
tain public policies and orders. The Na-
tional Labor Relations Board is not
merely a court to decide disputes between
employers and employees. By statute it
"is empowered . . to prevent any
person from engaging in any unfair
labor practice affecting commerce," and
the Board itself is the party complain-
ant in proceedings before it. Failure to
appreciate this positive dynamic charac-
ter of administrative law is to miss its
very essence and 'reason for existence.
But administrative tribunals possess a
power far greater than that of the ordi-
nary executive agent. They not only in-
vestigate and prosecute. They also de-
cide and, in view of the limited court
review permissible, with practical finali-
ty. In this phase of their functioning
they act as courts. There is therefore a
mingling, contrary to the principles of
the separation of governmental powers,
of the executive and judicial functions,
and a violation of that ancient precept
of the law that no man should be a
judge in his own cause. The principle
back of these doctrines should not, I be-
lieve, lightly be dismissed as outmoded
and inapplicable to our present economic
and governmental structure. Any indi-
vidual who has at one and the same time
the duty of prosecuting and judging,
labors under a psychological handicap
which. may either dull his zeal as an
advocate or warp his judgment as an
adjudicator. Many proposals have been
made for separation within our admin-
istrative organization of the executive
and judicial functions. In large admin-
istrative bodies, such as N. L. R. B.,
this may be possible. In the smaller
state commissions such a separation of
personnel would, however, involve a
duplication of effort and an expense that
seems impractical. The matter is one,
however, to which continuing attention
should be given.
In adopting a procedure for the con-
duct of their business, administrative
bodies have been singularly unhampered.
Legislatures have often declared that
their procedures shall be informal and
free from legal technicalities. While it
is universally admitted that an individual
who is affected in his private right by
action of government should at some
time in the proceeding have an oppor-
tunity to be heard, it is only recently that
much attention has been given to the
question of just what constitutes this
loosely defined "right to a hearing."
With that question courts and admin-
istrative bodies are today wrestling.
May I be so bold as to make a few sug-
gestions ?
Analyzed, the so-called "right to a
hearing" consists I believe of at least
five cardinal primary rights. (1) The
party affected by the tribunal's action
must have the right to present his own
case. (2) The party affected must be
advised of, and be given opportunity to
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meet the case against him. This is what
was decided in the second opinion of the
Supreme Court in Morgan v. United
States. Whether this notice be given by
pleadings as at common law, by the mak-
ing of oral or written arguments, or by
the device of a tentative 'report to which
exceptions may be made, is apparently
immaterial. (3) As a corollary to the
right of the parties to present evidence
and to know the evidence against them
comes the third principle, that the ad-
ministrative tribunal must render its de-
cision solely on the evidence presented at
the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties af-
fected. Interstate Commerce Comm. v.
L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S.Ct.
185, 57 L.Ed. 431. Only by confining
the administrative tribunal to the evi-
dence disclosed to the parties, can the
latter be protected in their right to know
and meet the case against them. This re-
quirement quite definitely regards the ad-
ministrative tribunals as of a quasi-judi-
cial character. It should not, however,
detract from their duty actively to see
that the law is enforced, and for that
purpose to use whatever evidence is
available, whether presented by the par-
ties to the hearing or not. The dilemma
is usually surmounted by having the
Commission's own agents or deputies
make investigations and then as wit-
nesses testify concerning what they have
discovered. (4) Closely connected with
the third principle is the fourth which
was declared in the first Morgan deci-
sion, (298 U.S. 468, 56 S.Ct. 906, 80
L.Ed. 1288) to the effect that the person
who is vested by statute with the duty
of deciding, must act on his own inde-
pendent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate in ar-
riving at a decision. This requirement,
if strictly applied, would paralyze most
of our large commissions. The volume
of work is such that it is literally im-
possible for the titular heads themselves
personally to decide all controversies
coming before their commissions. For-
tunately an easy solution of the difficulty
lies in statutory authority to examiners
or other subordinates within the depart-
ment to render final decisions with a
right of appeal to the Commission itself
if desired. (5) Lastly, the administra-
tive board should in all controversial
questions render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceed-
ing can know how the various issues in-
volved were determined and the rea-
sons for the decision rendered. An order
in the words of a statute applicable to
any one of a thousand different situa-
tions, is not only unfair to the parties,
but a dangerous incentive to hasty and
ill-considered action by the tribunal it-
self.
These hasty generalizations are not of-
fered in any dogmatic mood, but merely
as foci about which discussion of ad-
ministrative procedure may center. I am
not sanguine that anything but a very
general uniformity can be secured. The
tasks that the various commissions have
imposed on them vary so widely that no
one procedure can fit them all, and the
procedure of course must be bent to the
task, and not the task to the procedure.
I am convinced, however, that the time
has come for all persons interested in the
use of administrative law-administra-
tors, practitioners, academic men-to
consider seriously and laboriously the
question of what procedures, if any, are
common and essential in government
through the administrative agency or
commission. How can that procedure be
both efficient and at the same time pro-
tect the private rights of the parties
within the orbit of the Commission's ju-
risdiction ?
There is much inertia in undertaking a
task of this magnitude. Practical ad-
ministrators are primarily interested in
performing the task imposed upon them
by statutory mandate quickly and effi-
ciently without complication or delay.
Procedural requirements are sometimes
regarded as unnecessary legalistic ob-
structions to progress towards the objec-
tive they seek to achieve. This view is
often expressed by lay writers. In a re-
port of the National Association of Rail-
road and Utilities Commissioners con-
cerning public service commission pro-
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cedure, a professor at Illinois-not a
member of the law faculty-is quoted as
saying, "The ultimate and only socially
justifiable criterion by which the effec-
tiveness of such regulation should be
judged is its social consequences. Re-
sults are the major consideration. The
method by which such results are at-
tained is of secondary or incidental sig-
nificance-a mere means to an end. No
regulatory agency can properly be held
accountable for socially desirable results
unless it is free in respect to the proce-
dures necessary to secure those results."
The proponents of an administrative
procedure which would omit many of the
most significant safeguards against arbi-
trary action that the common law has
thrown about our ordinary courts, usual-
ly justify their position by reliance on
the highly expert character of the indi-
viduals who head and staff our regula-
tory commissions. It is inferred that
ordinary judicial procedures are inap-
plicable to a personnel which possesses
such a superior insight into and such a
refined, scientific and professional ap-
proach to the extremely difficult and tech-
nical problems with which they are con-
fronted. That there is considerable truth
in this position when a commission is
dealing with routine matters not of im-
mediate pressing concern to the people
and capable of fairly definite proof or
disproof, I do not deny. I doubt, how-
ever, whether such an admission should
be made concerning highly controversial
social and economic questions in which
a great portion of the public having a
vital stake, such as those involved in the
prescribing of rates for public utilities
and in regulating relations between cap-
ital and labor. I am somewhat doubtful
whether an absolute scientific objectivity
can be attributed even to administrative
commissions "appointed by law and in-
formed by experience" though they be.
Today it is quite common-and salutary
-to point out that the judges even of
our highest courts are not deities, but
only human beings, each with his distinct
social and economic preferences and
prejudices. Do not the titular heads
and the technical staffs of governmental
commissions and boards also have their
own pretty definite economic and social
views? There is need perhaps to caution
some of our publicists that they must not
commit the error of attributing to our ad-
ministrative commissions a godlike om-
niscience of right and wrong which we
now see cannot be attributed to the ordi-
nary courts of justice.
What I have just said has no refer-
ence to the remarks of any of the speak-
ers who have preceded me, nor is it an
attack on administrative tribunals in gen-
eral, nor on any administrative tribunal
in particular. It is simply to combat a
view which I have too often heard ex-
pressed which regards as unimportant
the formulation of an administrative pro-
cedure which will preserve for the pri-
vate individual his right to present his
own case, to know the claim against
him, and to be advised of the reasons for
the decision made concerning him.
From meetings like the present one may
grow, I hope, a cooperative effort to de-
sign an administrative process which will
both be efficient in the performance of
governmental tasks and at the same time
duly regardful of private right. An ad-
ministrative process of that type is the
only one which has any place in our
liberal, democratic form of government.
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I want to talk about the speakers who
preceded me. I am going to start with
the last and go up.
I want to take issue right away with
Professor Brown on two points. The
first point is that too frequently, in deal-
ing with this problem of administrative
procedure, dealing with the problem of
the criticism of administrative tribunals,
we contrast a systeim of administrative
justice with a very ideal system of judi-
cial justice, which all of us know does
not exist.
I think, as Mr. Madden and Mr. Lane
might bear me out, the problem of the
judge as a partisan is a problem that is
with us. Anybody who has had to plan
the legal strategy of litigating a single is-
sue throughout the country, picks his
courts and picks his judges. I don't
think we ought to forget those things
when we deal with this problem of ad-
ministrative justice, because that parti-
sanship that judges have revealed is
one of the reasons for the existence of
this thing called administrative justice.
The very fact that the judges too fre-
quently have been partisan on certain is-
sues has led the legislatures to entrust
the formulation and the definition of
these issues to tribunals other than
courts.
In the field of labor law, that was part-
ly the raison d'tre for a body like the
National Labor Relations Board, not
only the desire to acquire expertness, and
it has expertness, from which springs its
capacity to contribute to the development
of the relationships between capital and
labor. But loyalties to the ideas embod-
ied in the legislation is also a reason for
administrative tribunals. The desire for
a Granger viewpoint partly underlay the
creation of the I. C. C. as an adminis-
trative agency to defend and protect the
rights under the Interstate Commerce
Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq. Partisan-
ship on the part of the administrative tri-
bunals is thus to be expected. It is there
to carry out the provisions of the legis-
lation.
Partisanship or zeal on the part of ad-
ministrative tribunals in behalf of the
rights they are created to protect is as
much expected of them as zeal on the
part of judges in the defense of that
body of rights we are pleased to call our
liberties. We would oppose, for exam-
ple, the appointment of judges who were
not partisan to the liberties set forth in
the Bill of Rights.
The second point upon which I would
take issue with Professor Brown is in re-
gard to the existence of expertness on
the part of administrative tribunals as
contrasted with courts.
The average judge has for example
before him as the current of his business
divorce cases, will cases, contract cases.
He has to be an expert in innumerable
subjects. He doesn't have the opportu-
nity that the people with the administra-
tive agencies have to think and to spend
their time day after day, week after
week, year after year, in the effort to
solve a single problem, which alone
makes for expertness.
To take an illustration from the field
of public utility regulation, to which Pro-
fessor Brown referred. The interfer-
ence of the courts in the administrative
effort to establish a rate base other than
upon spot reproduction cost has, in my
judgment, bedeviled the law of public
utilities for the last twenty-five years. A
little more humility, a little appreciation
of what the problems of public utility
regulations were, would I think have led
the courts to leave the solution of that
problem in hands that were more compe-
tent to bring about a solution.
I want to move on to a consideration
of some of the features that were
brought out by some of the other speak-
ers. The ramifications of this question
of what is a fair hearing, what are the
requirements of a hearing, seem to me
to be immense. The thing that surprises
one about it is how little law there is in
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existence on the question of what a fair
hearing must be. The few cases men-
tioned by Mr. Smith, the few cases men-
tioned by the other speakers are, in sub-
stance, about all the law that we have had
on that subject.
You take the simple problem as to
whether or not a hearing needs to pre-
cede the adoption of an order or a regu-
lation, that in itself is a very difficult
problem. If you believe the courts who
tell you day in and day out that rate-
making is a legislative function, you
can't blame the Bituminous Coal Com-
mission for taking them at their word
and saying, "Well, it is a legislative func-
tion; as such, no hearing need precede
it"-a perfectly rational argument, and
yet one that we know is wrong.
I think we should come to the conclu-
sion, as Professor Fuchs suggested, that
we should get away from considering
this problem in terms of separation of
powers, and approach the thing realis-
tically, realizing that administrative func-
tions are not legislative functions, exec-
utive functions, quasi-legislative func-
tions, or the like, but that they are ad-
ministrative functions, and that we have
to fashion, just as other systems of jus-
tice have fashioned, modes and means of
procedure to see that justice is done in
that field.
I have very little patience with the ter-
minology that is so frequently present in
writing on administrative law, which
tries to bring our complicated society un-
der the doctrine which even at the time
when Montesquieu developed it was
gone. We still go on with the same lan-
guage, trying, by an analogical method of
reasoning that has really very little con-
tent, to discover the answer to problems
which should be discovered by empiric
methods.
The three outstanding problems that
were discussed this afternoon raise some
of the great problems facing administra-
tive justice. The first of these problems
relates to the fact that administrative
agencies of a large size, like the Federal
Trade Commission, the National Labor
Relations Board with 700 men, the SEC
with something around 1450 or 1500,
handle an enormous amount of work.
Mr. Madden has told us that it disposes
of about 1200 cases a year. The very
fact that there is this enormous amount
of work in the hands of these adminis-
trative agencies forces the delegation of
the function of deciding. That is the
thing that worries me as much as my as-
pect of the entire administrative prob-
lem.
Mr. Smith, in his remarks, said one
thing you feel about the I. C. C. is that
you-had a chance to be heard, and that is
a very important thing, this feeling that
you had a chance to talk to the man who
was going to decide your case.
President Buchanan, before he was
President, and when he was acting as
Chairman of the Judiciary Committee of
the House, made this remark: "Next to
the importance of doing justice is the be-
lief that justice is being done." You
must satisfy that requirement of the in-
dividual who comes before an adminis-
trative tribunal, that feeling that he
wants to talk to the man who is going to
decide that case. If he doesn't know
who is going to decide that case and if
he has his suspicion that it is going to
be decided by some two-pence-halfpenny
law clerk down the line, you will never
get anywhere, in my judgment, with
bringing into existence a feeling that jus-
tice is being done. But how to work
through that problem is a difficult one.
Mr. Lane has sketched for you the
procedure whereby a very busy outfit, the
Securities and Exchange Commission,
tries to dispose of its cases. I see no ob-
jection to the principle of delegating the
writing of opinions; it must be done, but
the delegating of the problem of judging
is another story. The framing of the
opinion can be left to outside hands.
But the man who decides a thing has to
have a sense of the record. He may not
have to pore over the record as a whole,
but he has to know what is in that rec-
ord, what the issue is, and to reach his
own conclusion with reference to it.
In order to attain that objective, it may
be necessary to break up and decentral-
ize the functions of some of our admin-
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istrative agencies. Here I believe there
is a field that deserves much more thor-
ough exploration than it has yet received.
The second important topic of this aft-
ernoon, in my judgment, was the position
of the trial examiner. I have very deep
feelings about the trial examiner. The
trial examiner is a very important indi-
vidual in the whole administrative pro-
ceeding. He is the person that you have
to rely upon unless you rely upon your
own counsel, which you shouldn't do, to
tell you what the facts are in that rec-
ord, to focus the issue.
Moreover, he is the person whose
sense of the fitness of things carries the
reputation of the administrative agen-
cy into community after community.
Whether he disposes of his business with
dispatch or gives a sense of fairness is
important for he is the commission to
thousands of individuals. Unfortunate-
ly, it is hard to get good men for trial
examiners. Two reasons are responsible
for that, in my judgment: One is that
the job is of a routine character. You
are deciding the same thing day after
day. Another is the unfortunate fact-
and I say unfortunate at this particular
time because of the present position tak-
en by some of the law officers of the gov-
ernment that they would like to put their
legal help under the civil service-that
the Civil Service Commission, not being
able to realize that the difference between
good and bad lawyers is incapable of de-
termination by an examination of their
paper records, lays down the requirement
in the Federal Government that you can-
not pay trial examiners more than $4,600
a year. That is an example of the Civil
Service Commission's sense of astute-
ness with reference to this very serious
problem in administrative law.
Thirdly, a word of this combination of
functions. I think the answer to that
was made in large measure by Mr.
Smith, namely, that the evils of any such
combination of functions can be correct-
ed by the administrative agencies them-
selves. You don't hear that complaint
with reference to the I. C. C. and yet in
many of the proceedings before the I. C.
C., the Commission takes a considerable
part in initiating action. You don't hear
the complaint very much with reference
to proceedings before the Securities and
Exchange Commission these days. You
heard it at the start because some of the
crooks shouted loudly along this line to
still any inquiry into their crookedness.
But the Commission now has so ar-
ranged functional division within the de-
partments themselves that the criticism is
avoided. That it exists elsewhere, how-
ever, and that it is a serious matter, I
have no doubt is true.
When I went to the Federal Trade
Commission, I found that the findings of
that Commission were, as a matter of
practice, drafted by the Commission's at-
torney in the case, the prosecuting attor-
ney. It seemed to me absolutely wrong
that that should be so. True, the Com-
mission exercised an independent judg-
ment before it said, "Issue an order, or
do not issue an order," but the findings
supporting that order were drafted by
the Commission's own attorney who had
presented the case. Naturally, he tied up
the respondent, so the respondent couldn't
move, with the findings he drafted.
Again and again I have seen abuses of
a similar nature. But the violations that
occur, occur as the result of an inexpert
organization within the administrative.
Whereas from another standpoint, this
combination of functions, as I intimated
before, has a very important social bear-
ing. You need to enforce laws, espe-
cially when you have and are likely to
have changing political conceptions dom-
inant at any particular time.
A party that comes into power wants
not only to put through its program as
a matter of legislation; it wants to put
through its program as a matter of ad-
ministration. If it is helpless or is sought
to be broken as, for example, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board was sought
to be broken by an utter disregard of all
the recognized precedents in the law-I
refer to the action of the lower courts
who stepped in and enjoined the Board
even from holding hearings-when you
run into a situation of that type you
can't wait for the occurrence of a shift
in judge-made law which though it will
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eventually come may be slow in doing so.
Speaking of the lag in judge-made law,
Dicey said, "If legislative law represents
the opinion of yesterday rather than to-
day; judge-made law, because of the
ages and training of our judges, tends to
emulate the law of day before yester-
day."
That time lag in judicial law-making
is a serious matter, and that time lag is
one of the important factors for trying to
bring about a better coordination between
enforcement and policy-making.
Finally, I would make one plea. It is
this: Advance in the system of adminis-
trative procedure will come only, as I see
it, from a thorough understanding of the
individual administrative units in our
government. The time is hardly ripe to-
day for loose generalizations about the
subject.
We are today, as I see it, in a period
where large portions of our thinking pop-
ulation resent administrative justice be-
cause it is something new. Professional
people resent, also, the loss of a jurisdic-
tion that theretofore was in the hands of
the courts, especially the lawyers and the
courts. From resentment grows criti-
cism, but to make that criticism produc-
tive, it does seem to me that we must
first have thorough understanding.
I was impressed with Mr. Smith's re-
marks when he spoke of a tribunal, of
which he knew, criticized it but also rec-
ognized that the tribunal gave you as
fair a guarantee of getting your rights
as other tribunals might.
Such criticisms as are launched against
administrative tribunals can, as I said
before, frequently be launched against
the means of administering justice in our
courts. I think it is important for us, in
our general consideration of this prob-
lem, to recognize that here we are at the
beginning, historically speaking, of a pe-
riod because we have only had fifty years
of experience with this problem, of a new
method of trying to administer justice,
and that method criticizes, certainly im-
pliedly criticizes, certain points in which
our thinking has been a little too com-
placent.
One is our dccepted belief that the so-
called adversary method is the only meth-
ed of administering justice. In your ad-
ministrative agencies there is a tendency
again and again to get away from the
purely adversary means of administering
justice, and, because you get away from
that method of administering justice, cer-
tain of the accepted maxims that are ap-
plicable to the adversary system have
very little play in this field.
.Consequently, to move in our thinking
from one field to another without, at the
same time, recognizing that the basic im-
plications of the way you seek to bring
about justice have shifted, is frequently
to fail to understand what is happening
within both systems.
